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CHAPTER 1

GENERAL

Section I.

INTRODUCTION

1-1. Purpose
This manual sets forth doctrine and establishes
procedures :for the management, planning, and
collection of information which, upon evaluation
and production into intelligence, is reported and
disseminated as Army technical intelligence. It
provides guidance for commanders, staff officers,
and other personnel and units,· and aids in understanding the concept and role of technical intelligence in the overall intelUgence requirements of ·
the commander.

1-2. Scape
a. The contents of this manual deal primarily
with technical intelligence organizations and the
objectives and functions of technical intelligence
operations. The manual outlines procedures and
establishes broad principles regarding the role of
military intelligence units engaged in technical inteUigence activities. In addition, it identifies those
sources and agencies available to assist in accomplishing the technical intelligence requirements of
the commander. Engineer topographic and terrain
· intelligence are discussed in FM 5-30 and FM
30-10; consequently, they are not included within
the scope of this manual.

b. The material presented herein is applicable
to general war, limited war, and cold war situa..
tions. Such situations include stability operations,
nuclear and nonnuclear warfare enviromnents,
and employment of chemical agents/munitions
and nuclear weapons. Protection from chemical
and biological agents and radioactive fallout is
also included.

e. This manual is in consonance with the following international standardization agreements,
which are identified by type of agreement and
number at the beginning of each appropriate ·
chapter and appendix in the manual :

Title

NATO CENTO SEATO
ABOA
STANAG STANAG SEASTAG SOLOG

Handling and RePQrting of Captured
Enemy . Equipment
and Documents ---- 2084
Nomenclature fo:r Soviet Bloc Army
Weapons and Equipment -------------- 2097

2084

2084

94

2097

1-3. Recommended Chan1es
Users of this manual are encouraged to submit
recommendations to improve its clarity ·or
accuracy. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which
the change is recommended. Reasons should be
provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be
prepared using DA Form 2028 (Recommended
Changes to Publications) and forwarded direct to
the Commanding Officer, US Army Combat Developments Command Intelligence Agency, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613. Originators of proposed
changes constituting significant modification of
approved Army doctrine may send an information
copy, through command channels, to the Commanding General, USACDC, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060. This action will facilitate review and
followup.

1-4. Deflnitiens
a. For definition of terms used see AR 810-25.
b. The relationship of intelligence and technical
intelligence is set forth below:
(1) Intelligence is the product resulting from
the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration,
and interpretation of all information concerning
one or more aspects of foreign countries or areas
which are immediately or potentially significant
to the development and execution of military
plans, policies, operations, and development of
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military equipment. Technical intelligence, which
is one aspect of military intelligence, plays a vital
role in the tactical and strategic intelligence picture and therefore must be .considered as part of
an overall integrated intelligence effort.
(2) Technical intelligence is that intelligence
concerning for~ign technological developments
and the performance and operational capabilities
of foreign materiel, which now or may eventually
have a practical application for military purposes.
As with all other intelligence, it is the end product
resulting from the collection and processing of
technical information. The scope of technical intelligence is broad. It includes all technical aspects
of foreign equipment, supplies, installations, facilities, communications, and captured or abandoned
items which have a practical application in furthering military operations. The scope also includes technical data (i.e., signal parameters/
characteristics/frequency operating modes, etc.)
of foreign communications equipment which are
derived through communication intelligence
(COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), and
electronic warfare support measures (ESM), as
well as captured friendly and allied materiel that
may have been in the hands of a hostile force.
Technical intelligence, then, contributes primarily
to the extension of the combat intelligence effort.
(See appendix B for categories of technical intelligence.)

Section II.

includes that foreign intelligence relating to basic
and applied research in natural and applied sciences, and in applied engineering techniques. Also
included are the scientific and technical characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of all foreign
military systems, weapons, weapons systems, and
other materiel; production methods employed in
their manufacture; and related technology pertaining to materiel operation, and logistic support.
b. Within the Department of the Army, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) has
general staff responsibility for all matters pertaining to intelligence and counterintelligence
activities. The organizational element within
ACSI which exercises general staff supervision
over S&T intelligence activities of the Army is the
Scientific and Technical Division, Directorate of
Foreign Intelligence. This division monitors intelligence produced and the intelligence activities involved in this production to determine that weapons and equipment, scientific, nuclear, chemical,
missile, space, and electronic requirements levied
on DA production facilities are fulfilled. This division also provides DA representation on scientific
and technical committees and working groups of
the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIE).

THE STRATEGIC EFFORT

1-6. Introduction

a. The objectives of strategic technical intelligence are to( 1) Determine capabilities, limitations, and
vulnerabilities of foreign technology, materiel, facilities, and installations.
(2) Exploit foreign technologies for the benefit of US Forces.
(3) Assist in the development of effective
countermeasures by providing intelligence to the
overall military research and development (R&D)
effort.
(4) Provide materiel and information upon
which to base the training of all Armed Forces
personnel.
b. The overall military technical intelligence
program is vital to the US national, scientific, and
technical intelligence effort. The technical intelligence organization of the Department of Defense
(DOD) includes elements of the Defense Iritelli-

1-2

1-5. Scientific and Technieal Intelligence
a. Scientific and Technical (S&T) Intelligence

gence Agency (DIA) and the three services or
military departments: Department of the Army;
Department of the Navy, and the Department of
the Air Force.

1-7. Defense Intelligence Agency

a. DIA coordinates the intelligence activities of
the three military departments and satisfies the
intelligence requirements of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and DOD. In the area of technical intelligence, DIA is responsible for the overall management and review of all technical intelligence activities throughout DOD.
b. The action element of DIA for its technical
intelligence responsibility is the Directorate of
Scientific and Technical Intelligence. Direct communication or coordination is authorized between
this directorate and the external technical intelligence agencies on nonpolicy matters relating to
the production of S&T intelligence. The principal
AGO 3118A
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producers of technical intelligence within DOD
are-( l) Directorate of ·Scientific and .Technical
Intelligence of DIA.
(2) Foreign Scienee ~nd Technology Center
(FSTC) of the US Army Materiel Command
(USAMC)
(S) Missile Intelligence Agency (MIA) of the
Army Missile Command of USAMC.
(4) Medical Intelligence Office of the Office of
the Surgeon General of the Army.
(5) Scientific and Technical Intelligence
Center (STIC) of the Department of the Navy.
(6) Foreign Technology Division (FTD) of
the Department of Air Force.

1-8. Strategic Role of DA Agencies
a. ACSI, DA, with. general staff responsibility
for .all S&T intelligence activities in the Army,
performs the following functions:
(1) Formulates policies and procedures
which insure that S&T intelligence activities of
the Army are carried out in the most efficient and
productive manner.
(2) Supervises the preparation and execution
of the Army·S&T intelligence program, in coordination with DIA, and provides for its integration
into the DOD Consolidated Intelligence Program
(CIP).
(3) Coordi'nates requirements for technical
intelligence originated by the DA staff and major
subordinate commands to insure that they are fulfilled.

b. USAMC is responsible for commanding, OJ>:erating, and managing two major CONUS-based
Army S&T production agencies: FSTC and the
USAMC Missile Intelligence Agency of·. the Mis-,
sile Command. USAMC, through .its subordinate
agencies, is responsible for providing U.S. strategic planners the military R&D effort and the
military S&T. effort with timely and appropriate
technieal intelligence, with the exception of medical S&T intelligence.
o. The Surgeon Gener~l of the Army is responsible for commanding, operating, and managing
the Medical S&T Branch which is part of the
:Medical Intelligence Office.

d. The Chief of Engineers has DA staff responsibility to provide program guidance to Army
component commands on requirements for
tary geographic intelligence, as outlined in FM

mili-
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5-80. Within the Corps of Engineers, the US
Army Topographic Command (USATOPOCOM)
is the primary element that deals with national
level, strategic intelligence.

e. The US Army Security Agency (USASA) is
r3sponsible for the exploitation of cryptologic and
other materiel in support of its 'assigned mission
areas as outlined in AR 10-122 and FM 32-10. In
addition, signal intelligence (SIGINT) and ESM
resources also compile technical data on the characteristics of foreign communications-electronics
equipment derived from intercept and analysis of
electromagnetic emissions.

f. Oversea commands are responsible for collecting and producing , S&T intelligence within
their capabilities and in accordance with validated DIA requirements. They are also responsible for exploiting and evacuating materiel to
CONUS as appropriate. Reference AR 765-2 and
AR381-9.
1-9. Strategic Procedures
a. A requirement for technical intelligence may
be originated by any agency or consumer within

the Army. Frequently, however, a research and
development (R&D) activity or major CONUS
command may levj' this requirement upon military intelligence resources.
b. Requirements are prepared using DD Form
1497 for intelligence production requirements and
forwarded to DIA for validation and t.asking. The
DIA tasking procedure recognizes the need for
direct departmental support. In turn, this support
will enable the production agencies to provide
·support to DA and intermediate headquarters for
quick reaction needs, briefings, and special purpose documents. Direct support tasks in response
to such requirements may be levied by the ACSI,
DA, on the FSTC, the Missile Intelligence Agency,
or the Medical Intelligence Office. The CG,
USAMC may levy direct support requirements on
FSTC and the Missile Intelligence Agency. The
Surgeon General may levy direct support requirements on the Medical Intelligence Office. The
Army organization for strategic technical intelligence is shown in figure 1-1. As requirements are
satisfied, the information and/or materiel are forwarded direct, or through major oversea command channels, to CONUS. Unless specific instructions to the contrary are given by a DA
agency, all items for CONUS exploitation will be
forwarded to the Commanding General, US Army
1-3
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Figure 1-1. Army orgoilization fo1 strategic tecnnical intelligence.
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Test and Evaluation Command, ATTN: STEAPFI, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland 21005,
in accordance with provisions -0f the theater
command. After foreign materiel has been received at Aberdeen Proving Ground, the decision
as to the site of actual exploitation of medical
materiel is determined by the Surgeon General or
his designated agent. A detailed exploitation plan
will be furnished ACSI by the agency designated
to perform the exploitation.

c. The major DA S&T intelligence production
effort in CONUS is located at FSTC, Missile Intelligence Agency, and the Medical Intelligence
Office. To consolidate the efforts of these organizations, DIA has established a system which standardizes S&T intelligence management and production procedures for the overall DOD S&T intelli-

AGO 8118A

gence production effort. In addition, certain responsibilities for production of S&T intelligence
have been assigned within DIA and to the military departments.
d. Final technical intelligence reports are disseminated to various consumers in accordance
with previously submitted statements of intelligence interest. A continual feedback of information from oversea producers to DIA and from
DIA and CONUS-producing units to the oversea
major commands is essential to the effectiveness
of the entire technical intelligence program. The
distribution of technical information from CONUS-producing units is made by DIA to the oversea
command to insure that military intelligence units
are kept abreast of important foreign technical
and scientific trends and developments.

1-5
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CHAPTER 2
ARMY TECHNIC:AL INTELLIGENCE
Section I.
2-1. Gene,ral
The United States must strive to maintain a position superior to all enemies and potential enemies
in any given area of technology and be alert to the
future technological developments of all nations.
In order to obtain this position the objectives of
technical intelligence are to:

a. Determine foreign technical materiel threats
as they affect strategic and tactical planners and
commanders.
b. Determine foreign technological capabilities
and limitations.

c. Provide information from which military
countermeasures are developed.
d. Provide information which will enable US
Forces to use foreign materiel and facilities.

e. Exploit new developments for US military
needs.

f. Obtain and exploit items in the DIA Registry,
Foreign Materiel Requirements Listing.
g. Provide input on a continuous basis to the

overall national integrated S&T intelligence program in consonance with theater policies.
h. Provide the technical intelligence aspec~s for
tactical and strategic studies on characteristics,
capabilities, and limitations of foreign facilities,
installations, materiel, and resources.

2-2. Mission of Tactical Technical
Intelligence Units
a. The mission of Army tactical technical intelligence units is to provide assistance to tactical
commanders through the selective examination,
evaluation, and classification of technical information derived from exploitation of foreign materiel
and facilities, and provide assistance in establishing security measures to prevent foreign examination of U.S. equipment and information.
AGO 3118A
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b. Tactical technical intelligence units/personnel at all levels perform a fourfold mission:
(1) They advise and assist the commander
and staff in meeting tactical planning needs in
technical areas.
(2) They assist the strategic S&T intelligence
effort by supporting theater DA and DOD agencies in the overall integrated technical intelligence
collection and analysis effort.
(3) They assist with training of units in
collection procedures.
(4) They advise units of current technical
intelligence requirements.

c. US Army tactical technical intelligence units
are provided primarily to support the field army
commander's technical intelligence requirements.
These military technical intelligence units provide
on the spot field analysis, detailed analysis, and
limited operational data from field testing. These
units are often in a position to make recommendations for exploitation and/or countermeasures.
Detailed analysis and evaluation are performed
by the technical intelligence company of the field
army and/or higher echelons. Final and detailed
technical analysis beyond field army and/or theater resources is performed in the appropriate
CONUS-producing unit.
d. Technical intelligence elements at all echelons
operate as functionally integrated teams to insure
maximum coordination, collation, and exploitation
of foreign arms and materiel.

e. Prompt exploitation at the lower echelons
provides usable tactical intelligence, assists in the
production of strategic technical intelligence, facilitates military training, and assists the overall
national R&D effort.

f. In unified or specified commands, the factors
of distance and processing time from the zone of
interior may make it desirable for the commander's intelligence organizations to perform certain
2-1
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functions normally associated with CONUS units ..
In such cases the unified or specified commander
advises the higher echelon concerned of the functions being performed. He also insures that his
action does not interrupt the flow of information
to the higher echelon. Included among these functions may be :
(1) Puhlication of technical intelligence bulletins.
(2) Publication of intelligence of a general
orientation nature.
(3) Preparation and dissemination of other
intelligence studies and documents which would
lose utility if delayed by preparation in the zone
of interior.
2-3. Theater Organization for Technical
lritelligence

a. The technical intelligence organizational
concept for theater army is based upon theater
requirements and the assigned technical intelliSection II.

b. The theater army G2 will develop a functional organization for his G2 division which reflects the usual theater army mission of coordination and supervision .of operational, administrative, and territorial responsibilities. Normally, the
special intelligence branch of the G2 division includes a S&T section which assists the G2 in fulfilling his technical intelligence responsibilities.
Upon receipt of collection directives and other
technical intelligence requirements, the theater
army G2 publishes specific directives. which are
sent through intelligence and ·technical channels to
collection agencies.

FIELD ARMY ORGANIZATION FOR TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

2-4. Field Army Echelon

a. General. The collection of technical information and the production and dissemination of
technical intelligence in the field army area of
operations require extensive activity coordination,
and continuity .of effort. The field army G2 is responsible for the direction and staff supervision of
the entire technical intelligence effort within the
field army. He is assisted by technical intelligence
staff personnel organic to the field army headquarters which is augmented by a technical intelligence coordinator and other technical intelligence personnel from the Army headquarters support section of the Military Intelligence Battalion,
Field Army. These personnel normally constitute
a technical intelligence division or branch within
the field army G2 section. Staff policy, guidance,
requirements, and directives pertaining to technical intelligence collection and production are formulateq by the technical intelligence staff element
of the field army G2 section and forwarded
through military intelligence channels for execution by the technical intelligence company.
b. Technical Intelligence Company. The technical intelligence company operates under the direct
control of the Military Intelligence Battalion,
Field Army (TOE 30-25). Figure 2-1 shows the
organization of this military intelligence battalion. The Technical Intelligence Company (TOE
2-2

gence mission. Requirements are generated by the
technical intelligence :needs of the command and
its subordinate elements. The technical intelligence mission and guidance for its accomplishment normally will be provided to the theater
army commander by the theater commander. Specific tasking as a result of DIA validated production requirements will follow this same channel.

30-34) provides for the functionalized execution
of the technical intelligence mission, exclusive. of
collection, within the field army. Figure 2-2 shows
the organization of the technical intelligence company. This groupin~ in one company of various
technical skills provides a capability for a coordinated technical intelligence effort; an interchange
of skills, knowledge, and experience; and a consolidation of specialized technical skills to insure the
varied functional technical intelligence support
necessary for the field army. This unit is normally
located in the vicinity of the headquarters of the
Field Army Support Command (FASCOM). For
a detailed discussion of the technical intelligence
company see FM 30-9.

2-5. Corps Echelon
The duties and functions of the corps G2 technical
intelligence section are similar to those of the
technical intelligence division or branch of the G2,
field army (para 2-4a). To augment the organic
technical intelligence coordinator of the corps G2
section, a technical intelligence coordinator and
other technical intelligence personnel are provided
by the attached military intelligence detachment
supporting the corps (TOE 30-18). These are
staff coordinating personnel and normally are not
employed in as operational role.
AGO 3118A
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2-6. Augmentation
Cellular functional technical intelligence teams
from TOE 30-600 may provide augmentation to
the military intelligence organization supporting
field army, corps, and division as required. These

AGO 8118A

augmentation teams are organized based on seven
collection areas: quartermaster, signal, chemical,
transportation, medical, engineer, and ordnance.
AR 310-10 describes the procedures for obtaining
authorization for these augmentation teams.

2-5
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CHAPTER 3
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONALIZATION
Section I.

3-1. Overall Concept
The five functional areas of technical intelligence
activities are communications-electronics intelligence, weapons and munitions intelligence, general support and equipment intelligence, mobility
intelligence, and medical intelligence. The proper
organization and employment of the technical intelligence specialists in support of these functional areas is critical to mission accomplishment.
When employed as functional teams, technical
analysis and evaluation is accomplished more
effectively. Personnel must not be given analysis
tasks which can be more efficiently performed by
other field army or theater assets. Each functionally organized technical intelligence team must be
tailored to perform the required mission. Teams
must be flexible in their operations since personnel will be required to perform extensive coordi-

Section II.

nation and liaison internally for mission success.
Teams should be "tailored" to perform a specific
technical intelligence function with consideration
given to the training and capabilities of the technical specialists. The functionalized areas of interest of technical specialists will frequently overlap. When possible, functional teams should be
composed of personnel having related .functional
qualifications. In addition to the capabilities listed
in the subsequent sections of this chapter, the
technical intelligence team should be capable of
coordinating with and conducting periodic briefings to division and higher command headquarters informing them of the equipment being employed by the foreign units within their area _of
operations or adjacent areas. The known capabilities and limitations of those aspects of any of the
five functional areas where new information is
acquired should be included in these briefings.

COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRON.ICS INTELLIGENCE

3-2. Obiectives
a. The primary objectives of technical intelligence specialists in the functional area of communications-electronics intelligence are to:
(1)
Provide
communications-electronics
equipment intelligence concerning the capabilities
and limitations of foreign communication and
noncommunication systems, both civilian and military.
(2) Provide data and communications-electronics /·e quipment intelligence If or1 possible :use for
cover and deception operations on the strategic
and tactical levels.
(3) Provide data for possible application in
developing new US electronic equipment and devices.
(4)
Provide
communications-electronics
equipment intelligence or strategic and tactical
planning.
AGO 3118A
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(5) Assist in providing tactical and strategic
estimates on enemy communication capabilities to
include the complete order of battle of ·enemy
units operating in a specified area of operation.
b. In meeting the above objectives, there is a
continuous need to examine, analyze, and test
communications-electronics equipment and devices; to analyze foreign communications equipment diagrams and schematics; and to analyze
electromagnetic emissions intercepted from operational foreign equipments. Recent communication
trends and developments necessitate that the
scope of communications-electronics equipment
intelligence be broadened to include wire, radio,
teletypewriter, television, satellites, telemetering
devices, electronic instruments, photography, computers, radar, facsimile, and laser communication
equipment or devices.
c. SIGINT and ESM resources are important
sources of information on the technical parame-

3-1
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ters of communications-electronics. equipment.
This information is derived through the detectiOn,
intercept, and analysis of electromagnetic emissions. Extensive liaison is, therefore, necessary
between communications-electronics specialists
and SIGINT/ESM elements.
d. In order to properly evaluate and interpret
information concerning foreign communicationselectronics R&D, and to keep abreast of civilian
and industrial communications projects, a techni.
cal library must be established. It should contain
communications-electronics information concerning details and performance data on a wide variety of items.

e. Data in the following areas are of primary
interest to communications-electronics equipment
intelligence production :
( 1) Radio equipment.
(a) Output power.
( b) Frequency range.
( c) Bandwidth.
(d) Modes of operation.
( e) Circuitry design.
(f) Antenna design.
(g) Antijamrning devices.
(h) Tube structure.
( i) Transistors.
{j) Equipment ruggedness.
(k) Major modifications.
( l) Modules.
( m) Power requirements.
(n) Size/type (fixed, mobile, or transport..
able).
(2) Telephone equipment.
(a) Types of operation.
( b) Power requirements.
( c) Working limits.
( d) Type of signal.
(3) Switchboards.
(a) Line capacity.
( b) Protection.
( c) Power requirements.
(d) Cord circuits.
( e) Types of operation.
.
(f) Size/type (fixed, mobile, or transportable).
( 4) Teletypewriter equipment.
(a) Method of transmission and receiving.
( b) Type of signal.
(c) Speed.
(d) Power requirements.
( e) Line current.
(f) Signaling code.
3-2

( 5) Facsimile.

(a) Maximum size of copy.
Type of recording.
( c) Drum speed.
(d) Scanning lines.
(e) Audio carrier frequency.
(f) Type modulation.
(g) Bandwidth.
(h) Power requirements.
(6) Carrier equipment.
(a) Channel capacity.
( b) Bandwidth.
(c) Line side operation.
( d) Loop side operation.
( e) Transmission media.
(f) System range.
(g) Operating levels.
(h) Signaling frequency.
(i) Type modulation.
{j) Power requirements.
( b)

f. Other general areas of interest to communications-electronics equipment intelligence are(1) Sensor devices.
(2) Missile guidance devices.
( 3) Power equipment.
( 4) Meteorological equipment.
(5) Electronic warfare (EW), electronic
countermeasures (ECM), ESM, and electronic
counter-countermeasures· (ECCM) equipment
and/or devices.
( 6) Guided missile control systems.
(7) VT fuze inf.ormation.
(8) Secure equipment (voice, TTY, an:d
data).
(9) Computers and peripheral equipment.
3-3. Capabilities of Commu11icationsElectronics Specialists

a. Communications-electronics specialists . are
capable of(1) Exploiting intelligence from foreign communications materiel.
(2) Assisting in the exploitation of foreign
scientific communicati-0ns-electronics information.
(3) Evaluating enemy communications-electronics equipment information as received on a
day-to-day basis.
(4) Supervising the collection artd evacuation
of enemy communications-electronics equipment.
AGO 3118.A

:fM 30-16

(5) Coordinating with and providing limited
assistance, as may be required, to other intelligence activities such as strategic intelligence elements.
(6) Maintaining, evaluating, and interpreting
information concerning military and civilian
R&D.

(7) Assisting in the exploitation of foreign
communications complexes and facilities by US
Forces. This may require communications-electronics and EW personnel to accompany combat
elements whose missions include the capture of
communications bases or targets for prompt analysis and exploitation.
(8) Assisting in the interrogation of all
enemy captives or returnees who possess information concerning enemy or foreign communications-electronics equipment or the manner in
which it is deployed.

Section 111.

(9) Assisting in the exploitation of all captured documents dealing with communicationselectronics equipment to obtain immediate combat
technical intelligence as well as detailed technical
data.
(10) Exploiting information derived from intercepted foreign signals to acquire technical data
on the characteristics of foreign communicationselectronics equipment.
(11) Exploiting intelligence obtained from
enemy utilization of sensor devices.
b. Signal personnel are capable of assisting G2's
and S2's in performing their technical intelligence
roles by:
(1) Performing limited analysis of enemy
communications-electronics equipment systems
and documents.
(2) Providing photographic support for technical intelligenc~ activities.

WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS INTELLIGENCE

3-4. Obiectives

3-5. Capabilities

The objectives of weapons and munitions intelligence are to provide technical intelligence evaluation and analysis of-'

Weapons and munitions specialists have the capabilities to:

a. Free rockets, guided missiles, and associated
equipment including guidance and launching
equipment.
b. Foreign weapons and combat vehicles to include tanks, towed and self-propelled guns, howitzers, and armored personnel carriers.

c. Nuclear and nonnuclear ammunition, to include rocket and warhead sections.
d. Chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons
and munitions and smoke, incendiary, and flame
weapons and munitions.

e. Propellants, explosives, and pyrotechnics, to
include mines.

f. Demolition techniques, barriers material,
minefield layouts.
g. Specialized munitions and simulators designed for use in cover and deception operations.

h. Enemy render safe procedures for all US and
foreign explosive ordnance.
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a. Provide technical guidance to corps technical
intelligence collection teams and to evaluate the
technical information received from them.
b. Inspect foreign vehicles and weapons to determine modifications and changes.

c. Identify, examine, and submit reports on tactical capabilities of foreign weapons and munitions.
d. Assist in the breakdown and assembly of
equipment and in the testing of vehicles, equipment, and accessories.

e. Assist analysis of parts, assemblies, engines,
power trains, and chassis for collation, updating,
and incorporation of data in technical manuals
and handbooks.

f. Assist in the production of technical intelligence from factory markings.
g. Assist in the identification and evaluation of
flamethrowers, . smoke generators, riot control
agent munitions, and chemical and biological
weapons and munitions.

3-3
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Section IV.

GENERAL SUPPORT AND EQUIPMENT INTELLIGENCE

3-6. General
The general support and equipment section of the
evaluation and analysis platoon, technical intelligence company, has two primary areas of interest: logistics intelligence and chemical, biological,
and radiological technical intelligence.

3-7. Obiectives of Logistics Intelligence
a. The primary objectives of logistics intelligence are to(1) Provide logistics intelligence on enemy
supplies and resources. Specific areas of interest
are subsistence, individual clothing and equipment, decoy items of equipment, general supplies,
petroleum, maintenance, and equipment for such
services as graves registration, laundry, and bath.
(2) Provide the field army with logistics intelligence, based on immediate exploitation of material and information acquired, as may be significant or contributing to the immediate tactical
mission.
(3) Provide logistics information and materiel for exploitation at theater or CONUS level.
b. Technical intelligence analysis of enemy logistics support must include consideration of
enemy economic factors (e g,. food, agriculture,
and industrial production), the enemy labor force,
and enemy technological capabilities. In this regard, close coordination between technical intelligence and strategic intelligence elements at field
army is imperative.

c. Examination of captured items must be continuous and must include consideration of the applied sciences which made development of. the
item possible. Increase, decrease, or change in a
nation's equipment and/or supplies gives indication of a change in that country's logistics support
capabilities. All analyses must be made with consideration of the social and cultural environment
of the country concerned.

3-8. Capabilities of Logistics Specialists
a. Logistics specialists have the following capabilities:
(1) Determining the design, performance,
source, and methods of manufacture and storing.
(2) Examining logistics organizations, installations, and storage depots.
(3) Determining characteristics, limitations,

vulnerabilities, and military potential of military
and civilian facilities.
(4) Preparing technical intelligence reports
and studies concerning such items as petroleum,
food, clothing, equipment, and decoy items of
equipment.
( 5) Processing and extracting information
from foreign commodities and equipmen.t
acquired in a field army area of responsibility.
( 6) Assisting in the training of field army
personnel in foreign equipment and logistics intel·
ligence.
(7) Producing and maintaining information
and intelligence concerning foreign materiel and
commodities.
(8) Assisting in the analysis o:f foreign storage, packing, and preparation of food and equipment.
·
b. In conjunction with other technical intelligence specialists, logistics specialists provide a
capability to the field army for supervising battlefield collection of a wide variety of items. For
example, through the use of mobile laboratories
available at, theater level, the analysis, evaluation,
and identification of captured foreign petroleum
products and facilities for US tactical uses are
expedited.

e. Other areas of technical intelligence to which
logistics specialists can contribute are analysis of :
(1) Troop subsistence.
(2) Logistics support equipment and supplies
in all commodity groups as listed in SB 708-21.
(3) Food spoilage and contamination.
(4) Packaging and marking.
(5) Data concerning draft animals.
(6) Individual and collective protection
equipment, protective clothing, and decontamination supplies.
d. Logistics technical intelligence may assist
order of battle sections by identification of enemy
uniforms, insignia and decorations, and by maintaining logistics files.

3-9. Obiectives of CBR and Nuclear
Technical Intelligence
The objectives of CBR and nuclear technical intelligence area. The collection, examination, evaluation, identification, and dissemination of information on
AGO SllSA

fM 30-16

materiel ·and documents pertaining t-0 enemy
chemical, biological, and nuclear operations.

3-10. Capabilities of CBR and Nuclear

b. The collection of samples of chemical and
biological agents and radiological materiel employed against friendly forces; the identification
of chemical agents and/or transmittal of samples
to a supporting general chemical laboratory for
chemical and toxicological analysis; the transmittal of biological samples to a supporting medical
laboratory for microbiological analysis; and the
collection and forwarding of radiological samples
to a supporting general chemical laboratory for
determination of radioisotopic composition.

Chemical personnel in technical intelligence units
are capable of providing the following assistance:

c. The collection, evaluation, and dissemination
of information pertaining to the enemy's capability of and :techniques and procedures for; decontamination; individual and collective protection;
CBR detection and identification systems; warning of chemical, biological and nuclear attacks:
impregnation and reimpregnation of clothing;
cover and deception measures; field laboratory
services; fallout predictions; and radiological
monitoring and survey operations.
d. The collection and dissemination of information on the enemy's capability for chemical and
biological agent production, to include their storage, insta11ations, and stockpiles of chemical and
biological agents/munitions, and for chemical and
biological operations in support of tactical operations.

e. Assistance, within the technical intelligence
company capabilities, in developing field countermeasures against enemy chemical, biological, and
nuclear operations.

Section V.

a. Examining, evaluating, and identifying captured enemy chemical and biological agents and
radiological materiel.
b•. Examining, evaluating, and identifying,
when possible, enemy materiel related to chemical, biological, or nuclear operations.

c. Preparing and forwarding samples of biological agents to medical laboratory facilities for
identification.
d. Preparing and forwarding samples of chemical and radiological materials to the general chemical laboratory.

e. Providing technical assistance to staffs at
Army and corps levels on chemical, biological, and
nuclear matters.

f. Maintaining liaison with the theater general
chemical laboratory.
g. Preparing intelligence reports on chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear matters, -and
estimates of enemy capabilities and intentions for
employing chemical, biological, and nuclear operations.

h. Analyzing and identifying enemy-delivered
chemical agents within the limitations of the CBR
agent sampling kit and the CBR agent analyzing
kit.

MOBILITY INTELLIGENCE

3-11. Obiectives
The objectives of mobility technical intelligence
cover most aspects of engineer and transportation
activity at all echelons of the foreign military organizations. Engineer and transportation support
have become increasingly important in all types of
military operations. Mobility technical intelligence specialists will usually be involved in both
strategic and tactical technical intelligence. (See
FM 30-5 for the interrelationship of combat and
strategic intelligence.) The field army technical
intelligence company will have to meet the needs
of the theater and lower echelons. Frequently, the
same items of mobility intelligence may be needed
by various levels within the field army and the
AGO SUSA
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theater. Mobility technical intelligence will play
an important part in the overall strategic and tactical planning :for field army and theater forces.

3-12. Capabilities
a. Transportation mobility specialists contribute to the production of technical intelligence concerning foreign air, land, and water transportation equipment of immediate or potential military
importance. This intelligence concerns characteristics, conditions, development, organization, ma. teriel, operation, maintenance, construction, performance, eapabilities, and limiting factors of foreign transportation equipment and supplies. Mobility technical intelligence is necessary for con-
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tingency planning and emergency operations.
Transportation specialists will need tO produce intelligence on adjacent friendly countries for use
by technical and strategic planners and combat
service support elements since US Forces may
often use another nation's transportation system.

foreign capabilities to transport missiles and nuclear weapons.
(8) Evaluation of economic and technical aspects of foreign transportation systems.
(9) Compilation of data on foreign transportation modes, systems, facilities, and equipment.

b. Mobility specialists can contribute to the following:
(1) Integration and coordination of the
transportation collection effort, to include estimates of capabilities of transportation facilities
and systems.
(2) Evaluation, interpretation, processing,
and dissemination of transportation information
and data to include estimates of capabilities of
transportation facilities and systems.
(3) Assistance in the preparation of transportation estimates.
(4) Assistance in the interrogation of civilian and military personnel having transportation
intelligence information.
(5) Assistance in strategic transportation
planning.
(6) Evaluation of new transportation modes,
systems, and related equipment.
(7) Assistance in determining an estimate of

c. Engineer mobility specialists contribute to
limited analyses and evaluation of technical intelligence concerning the following:
(1) Foreign vehicles, except combat vehicles.
(2) Foreign engineer equipment to include its
capabilities.
(3) Foreign construction operations, techniques, and resources.
(4) Materiel quality and shortages.
(5) Foreign depots, dumps, and supply
points.
(6) Water-crossing equipment and tech.
niques.
(7) Demolition techniques, barrier materials,
and minefield layouts.
(8) A bibliography of foreign military and
civilian engineer specialists and engineer order of
battle.
(9) Studies to evaluate the destructive capability of nuclear weapons.

Section VI.

ME,DICAL INTELLIGENCE

3-13. Definitions
a. Medical intelligence is intelligence resulting
from collection, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of foreign medical, bio-scientific and environmental information. This intelligence is of interest to strategic and military medical planning
and operations for the conservation of the fighting
strength of friendly forces. It will also aid in formulating assessments of foreign capabilities in
both military and civilian sectors. Medical intelligence must retain integrity so that the end product will include all available information, immediately or potentially significant. This includes information which affects the health and welfare of
men and animals in actual or potential areas of
military operations. Such information is vital in
both strategic and tactical planning and will influence military operations.
b. Medical technical intelligence is not primarily materiel oriented. Examination, evaluation,
and classification of medical materiel are only segments of the total medical technical intelligence

effort. Medical intelligence is a functional entity
and should not be fragmented. Strategic requirements indicate the need for intelligence concerning the relatively broad areas of foreign medical
technical developments, performance, and operational capabilities.

3-14. Obiectives ·
The objectives of medical intelligence are to provide the commander, his medical staff, and his
operational planners with intelligence that will
provide a precise estimate of the environmental
factors confronting a force in a given geographical area. This includes epidemiological inf ormation, flora, fauna, and sanitary conditions as well
as the potential enemies' field medical delivery
system. This fotelligence is designed to insure conservation of friendly forces fighting strength. At
the strategic level, medical intelligence objectives
are the provisions of intelligence that contribute
significantly to the formulating of rrational and
international policy predicated on foreign capabilAGO 3118A
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ities in both military and civilian sectors of the
bio-scientific community.
3-15. Capabilities,
a. Medical intelligence resources for exploitation· purposes in a theater will be few. A 12-man
medical intelligence section is assigned to the Military Intelligence Group and the Military Intelligence Battalion supporting the theater army and
field army respectively. A smaller 4-man team
may be assigned in support of separate corps and
cellular 3-man units are attached where support is
required. HQ Company, Medical Command, as
well as HQ Detachment, Medical Group and HQ
Detachment, Medical Brigade, as presently constituted, have a token medical intelligence complement in the Plans, Intelligence, and Operations
Section/Division.
b. The theater surgeon can coordinate the employment of medical units in support of medical
intelligence activities. He may also arrange for
support of field army medical intelligence activities by theater level units as appropriate. In addition, the theater surgeon and his staff can assist
the field evaluated medical intelligence produced
by :field army technical intelligence elements. The
:field army surgeon can assist in providing requirements for medical information/intelligence
to the Command G2. The intelligence produced
may be coordinated and evaluated by the field
army surgeon and staff as necessary.

e. The Medical Intelligence Office, Office of the
Surgeon General, at CONUS level can provide information, debriefing specialists, and in-depth materiel .exploitation as designated in AR 381-9,
Army Scientific and Technical Intelligence. Transmission of this type intelligence may be accomplished direct through medical technical channels.
d. Medical intelligence specialists are capable of
performing the following functions:
(1) Collect, examine, classify, and evaluate
raw information concerning non-US health problems, training, and materiel used by foreign medical services.
(2) Provide medical intelligence information
to the field army surgeon through G2 for professional evaluation prior to dissemination.
(3) Assist in the interrogation of selected
prisoners of war, refugees, defectors, and escapees
to obtain medical information.
(4) Assist in the investigation of medical aspects of incidents involving diseases resulting
from enemy biological agent employment and casAGO 3118A

ualties resulting from enemy chemical and nuclear operations.
( 5) Accomplish initial examination and evacuation of captured foreign medical materiel to include escort of live cultures to CONUS.
(6) Assist in the compilation of environmental data pertinent to health aspects of military
operations.
(7) Provide technical staff advice on medical
intelligence to include the scope of medical subj ects to be incorporated into medical unit training
programs.
(8) Provide limited analysis of drugs, serums, and antibiotics.
(9) Provide intelligence information on the
movement, quantities, 80urces, potency, and types
of illicit drugs that may be encountered by
friendly forces.
(10) Assist in the identification of enemy
chemical and biological agents and radiological
materiel.
(11) Assist in the evaluation of fillings of
enemy chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.
(12) Provide information and data on medical aspects of enemy combat operations.
(13) Assist, as required, in the preparation
of medical studies and reports of tactical significance.
(14) Collect and examine status, capabilities,
and limitations of foreign military and civilian
medical installations and facilities.
(15) Provide advice on communicable diseases.
e. Medical information of potential intelligence
value is primarily obtained by-:(1) Direct observation of patients and medical support operations, both military and civilian.
(2) Discussions with personnel involved directly or indirectly with medical support operations (enemy, allied, or civilian).
(3) Study of military and civilian reports
and publications of medical or technical nature.
(4) Interrogation or interview of prisoners
of war, refugees, evacuees, displaced persons, and
friendly escapees.
(5) Examination, exploitation, and disposition of foreign medical scientific and technical
materiel for intelligence as well as R&D purposes.
(6) Coordination with Civil Affairs public
health teams who obtain information on the
public health service and facilities in an area of
operation.
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(7) Review of foreign individual medical records, statistics, and health reports to assist in further evaluation of the efficiency of friendly materiel used.
(8) Evaluating foreign capabilities through
reviewing and interpreting individual immunization records and contemplated or existing preventive medicine programs. (Prophylactic immunizations, drugs, protective drugs, clothing, and insect
repellents.)

f. Special Warfare Capabilities
(1) Medical intelligence contributes significantly to the planning, preparation, and execution
of activities related to unconventional warfare,
stability operations, and psychological operations
by( a) Providing information on the best approach to foreign and primitive cultures.
(b) Recommending the adoption of techniques to reduce interpersonal stress developing
in small isolated detachments working in a foreign culture.
( c) Advising the planning staff on the
medical evaluation of ethnic groups in operational
areas or potential areas of commitment. Of
concern will be those factors which affect their
efficiency, capability, and well-being.
(2) The medical intelligence officer in support of guerrilla forces will work closely with the
Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force
(JUWTF). He will assist the J2 in determining
medical intelligence requirements, establishing

EEI and ascertaining which agencies can fulfill
the special medical intelligence requirements for
the support of the guerrilla forces. The medical
intelligence officer will provide information concerning the level of medical training suitable to
the guerrilla forces as well as physical and. other
medical limitations affecting their performance.
(3) The nature of the enemy and the presence of both friendly and hostile civilians in stability operations, place additional requirements
upon the command for medical intelligence. In addition to determining the receptivity of the local
people to western medical practices, medical intelligence can assist in intelligence activities involving close coordination with and participation in
civil police type operations such as;
(a) Documentation of civilians (and registration).
(b) Informal interrogations.
(c) Maintenance of extensive dossiers.
( d) Medical civic actions.
(4) The detailed intelligence required for
psychological operations often is complementary
to the accomplishment of the medical mission.
Medical personnel are concerned with the attitudes of friendly forces, the enemy, and the civilian populace as they affect the health, medical
practices, morale, and the individual's well-being.
This large area of mutual interest indicates the
need for close coordination and liaison between
the psychological operations personnel and medical intelligence personnel.
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·FM 30-16

CHAPTER 4
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PLANNING

4-1. General

Planning of the collection effort involves basically
the same procedures and considerations regardless of the type of information desired. The collection of technical information is but one facet of
the overall collection effort· of a command. See
appendix B for the major categories of technical
intelligence used for planning purposes. Planning,
a continuing process, involves initially the establishment of general policies and procedures for
the collection and production effort (FM 30-5).
Subsequently, it involves modification and expansion of the plan to support specific combat missions and operations of the command. The key to
effective collection of technical information is the
tactical commander and his unit. Consequently,
incorporation of technical intelligence planning
into the planning for specific missions or operations of tactical units is essential to the production of effective technical intelligence. Preparation of technica1 intelligence plans is performed
by the intelligence officer or staff at each echelon
of command. The technical intelligence unit commander is responsible for internal planning of his
unit's operations.
4-2. Initial Planning

Initial planning will be directed more to the establishment of policies and procedures for the collection and production effort than to the specific intelligence requirements of the command. Initial
planning must include provisions for-

a. Proper training of members of the command
in recognition, handling, and reporting of foreign
materiel and documents.
b. Insuring retention in place, if practicable, of
new or unusual items of captured enemy materiel
for initial analysis and exploitation by appropriate technical intelligence personnel.

c. Safeguarding captured materiel against looting, unauthorized destruction, or retention as souvenirs.
AGO 3118A

d. Standardized reporting of captured enemy
materiel and dissemination of reports to higher
and other appropriate headquarters.

e. Insuring availability of technical intelligence
personnel, as required, in conjunction with specific missions or combat operations.

f. Supervision and direction of the evacuation
of captured or abandoned enemy materiel from
collecting points. through or to the field army area.
4-3. Planning Procedures
a. It is imperative that technical inteUigence
management, planning, collection, and production
procedures be standardized to minimize duplication of effort and dissipation of resources. Standardization of planning and reporting procedures
facilitates production, selection of resources for
collection, programing, meeting time schedules,
and dissemination of technical intelligence.
b. Development of the technical intelligence
plan involves the following steps:
(1) Determination of the technical intelligence requirements based on the mission of the
command and the requirements of higher headquarters.
(2) Determination of priorities to insure efficient utilization of collection resources.
(3) Balancing of requirements with collection and production capabilities.
( 4) Selection of appropriate collection agencies and issuance of orders and requests for specific information.
(5) Formation of appropriate functional
teams to insure maximum materiel exploitation.
(6) Review of vital technical intelligence support areas to determine adequacy of equipment
tags, evacuation procedures, provisions for establishment of specific collecting points, and other
administrative and logistical items and procedures.

c. The planning effort is continued by the supervision of the intelligence officer or member of his
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staff over the collection effort to insl,1.re compliance with orders, monitor incoming information,
and insure that the overall technical intelligence
plan is working effectively.
d. Technical intelligence planning must include
consideration of technical intelligence production,
its responsiveness to needs, and the cost of the
overall production effort.

4-4. Technical Intelligence Plan
a. The detailed preparation of the formal technical intelligence plan is accomplished by the technical intelligence coordinator who is attached to
the intelligence staff at corps and higher levels.
He coordinates the plan with technical intelligence units and with other general and special
staff elements. The purpose of the plan is to establish procedures for the following:
(1) Collection and processing of technical information.
(2) Handling of foreign materiel.
(3) Dissemination of technical intelligence.
(4) Organization for intelligence task force
operations.
( 5) Employment of the functional technical
intelligence teams.
(6) Determining additional information or
equipment needs concerni:rw enemy materiel.
b. A recommended format for the technical intelligence plan is contained in appendix C. The
plan, when issued, is an appendix to the intelligence annex of the operations order.

c. Supporting technical intelligence plans will
be prepared at subordinate echelons by the appropriate intelligence officers.
4-5. Technical Intelligence Requirements
and Priorities

a. Technical Intelligence Requirements.
(1) General. The command intelligence
officer, in coordination with the technical intelligence unit commander, will determine the technical intelligence requirements of the command and
the order of priority. Technical intelligence requirements serve to focus the attention of intelligence agencies of the command on the current
specific technical information needs; they also
serve as the basis for orders and requests issued
to implement the collection effort.
(2) Formulation of requirements. Formulation of technical intelligence requirements is
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accomplished in a manner parallel to that of the
formulation of combat intelligence requirements.
The following considerations, with occasional
modifications, will serve as guides in formulation
of technical intelligence requirements:
(a) Enemy technical capabilities.
( b) Enemy technical vulnerabilities.
( c) Weather and terrain information.
(d) Technical order of battle information.
( e) The next or forthcoming mission or
operation of the command.
(f) Prevention of technical surpirse to the
command.
(g) Technical information needs of higher
and adjacent headquarters.
(3) Coordination of technical intelligence
needs. Each echelon of command receives the

technical information requirements of higher,
lower, and adjacent headquarters; integrates
them with those of the command ; incorporates
them into collection directives and requests; and
disseminates these orders and requests to appropriate collection sources and agencies. Close coordination must be effected between headquarters to
assist planning and collection. Many requirements
originate at DA or DOD level and are forwarded
in the form of collection directives or specific intelligence collection requirements. Conversely the
requirements of a lower echelon may be satisfied
quicker and more satisfactorily at a higher echelon or by an adjacent unit.

b. Priorities. Priorities are utilized to direct the
collection resources of a command toward definite
objectives in priority of their needs. Requirements from higher headquarters will include spe..
cific priorities. Priorities of the local command
will ·be governed by command SOP whjch will
guide the intelligence officer in assigning priorities
to the technical intelligence requirements. Recurring technical requirements should be programed
in advance and priorities changed in accordance
with the critical dates involved (e.g., to meet recurring deadlines for annual studies in specific
technical areas).
/f/

c. Requests for technical intelligence. Requests
originating within the field army will be forwarded to the appropriate command through intelligence channels. Such requests must be as spe..
cific as possible. If they are based on previous
technical and/or combat intelligence reports, such
reports must be fully identified. Over-statement of
requirements must be avoided. Requests for techAGO 811SA
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nical intelligence will follow theater policies. As a
minimum, they should include the following:
(1) Requesting organization.
(2) Specific requirement.
(;3) Scope of ·r equirement.
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(4) Reason for requirement.
( 5) Pertinent data of assistance to technical

intelligence personnel.
( 6) Date desired.
(7) References (if applicable).
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CHAPTER 5
COLLE.CTION AND COLLECTION AGENCIES

Section I.

5-l. General
a. Technical intelligence collection teams are dependent almost entirely on other units (particularly tactical units) for the acquisition of foreign
materiel and documents. For this reason frequent
liaison and coordination with all types of units
are essential to stress the importance of technical
intelligence requirements, particularly those with
high priority. Close coordination with intelligence
personnel operating at lower echelons is particularly important since their operations throughout
any area enable them to acquire significant techni~
cal intelligence information and materiel. M-0st
items of technical intelligence interest will be
acquired initially by tactical units in the course of
combat operations. Tactical or other units may
also acquire items by discovery in an overrun
area, seizure (in raids), or requisitioning, pur~
chase, or confiscation (e.g., as by civil affairs
units).
b. The intelligence officer or staff, in developing
the technical intelligence plan, will select those
collection agencies which can best fulfill the needs
of technical intelligence. The technical intelligence
company should make frequent recommendations
to the command intelligence officer or staff for
inclusion in the technical intelligence plan of the
company's specific equipment and materiel needs
as well as requirements for essential technical
documents, manuals, and photographs. When only
component elements of a piece of equipment are
required, identification must be sufficiently precise
to preclude the unnecessary collection of the complete item. Collection agencies must be made
aware of the potential value of new or unusual
items of opportunity, i.e., an item not included in
requirements or wanted lists.
c. Many priority technical intelligence collection
requirements generated by programs at national
and DOD levels will be distributed to collection
agencies in the form of the Registry, Foreign MaA.GO SUSA.
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teriel Requirements Listing. Such equipment,
when obtained, must be evacuated immediately
(chap 6). Technical intelligence collection personnel at corps must maintain familiarity with this
list, and tactical units and other collectors must
receive instructions on the action to be taken
should such listed items be acquired.

5-2. Coordination
a. Frequent coordination between technical intelligence elements and all types of units within
the field army is essential and will facilitate and
supplement the technical information collection
effort. Necessity for coordination with tactical
units has been mentioned. Invaluable assistance
may be obtained by technical intelligence personnel through coordination and Hai.son with such
diverse units as air defense, signal, intelligence,
Army aviation, and general and special staff elements, The advantages of coordination with units
of the field army support command and its subordinate facilities should not be overlooked.
b. Accomplishment of the following coordination objectives will contribute immeasurably to the
technical intelligence collection effort:
(1) Prompt securing and reporting of foreign
materiel by capturing units.
(2) Location and identification of foreign
items and technical information obtained by
means other than capture.
(3) Acquisition of baekground and collateral
information pertaining to foreign materiel.
(4) Maintenance of current knowledge (by
technical intelligence personnel) on technical
trends and developments.
(5) Determination of the potential for collecting new or any previously unacquired items of
foreign materiel.
(6) Orientation of combat, combat support,
and combat service support units and personnel
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on their technical intelligence roles, and determination of their requirements for technical intelligence.
(7) Comparison and exchange of information, as authorized, with allied collection and techSection H.

COLLECTION AGENCIES

5-3. Introduction
A collection agency for technical intelligence is a
person, unit, organization, or instrumentality
which may collect or acquire foreign materiel or
data. Acquisition may be through routine collection by troops, research, observation, analysis and
evaluation, or interrogation. Technical intelligence collection agencies include:

a.. Combat troop units (including Special Forces
operational detachments).
b. Military intelligence units (e.g., interrogation, counter-intelligence, imagery interpretation,
and special collection elements).
c. Corps technical intelligence teams.
d. Psychological operations units.

e. Strategic intelligence elements.

f. Airborne infantry ranger company units.
g.

Civil affairs units.

h. Engineer topographic and terrain units.

i. USASA and EW units.
j. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units.

k. Military police units.

l. CBR reconnaissance teams.

m. Combat service support units.

5-4. Combat Troops
Units in contact are usually the first to encounter
new or modified foreign materiel, often with related operating instructions or other accompanying technical documents. The intelligence officer at
each level must insure that captured equipment or
documents are recovered for technical intelligence
exploitation. Vital technical intelligence materiel,
particularly new discoveries, should not be destroyed prior to technical intelligence exploitation, circumstances permitting. Enemy materiel,
documents, and logistical complexes must be
promptly safeguarded and reported through intelligence channels so that the maximum technical
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nical intelligence agencies, as well as with those of
other US services and agencies.
( 8) Coordinating and exchanging information as authorized with SIGINT/ESM collection
units.

data. may be obtained. This is of special importance in the case of documents relating to enemy
communications-electronics systems, e.g., code
books, call signs, frequency tables, communications-electronics operation instructions (CEO!),
communications-electronics standing instructions
(CESI), cryptographic data and items, and encrypted items. Items, control knobs, and switches
of communications equipment should not be
moved until they have been photographed or their
positions recorded. The foregoing considerations
must be included in all operational plans and in
briefings at each level of command. They should
also be emphasized in unit training programs.
5-5. Military Intelligence Units
The activities and operations of military intelligence units within the field army result in access
to, or acquisition of, numerous technical documents, data and items of information on foreign
materiel. Military intelligence personnel have frequent contact with military and civilian personnel
who are excellent sources of technical information. The functions of interrogation, counterintelligence and special collection elements result in
the acquisition of information of great significance to technical intelligence. These elements are
responsive to specific requests for technical information. Imagery interpretation elements are particularly helpful in establishing collection potential and confirming certain aspects of technical
intelligence.
5-6. Corps Technical Intelligence Collection
Teams

Technical intelligence collection teams are trained
in the collection of, and search for, items of technical intelligence interest and related data and information. Targets of their collection and search
activities include foreign materiel, facilities.
methods, techniques, and technical activities.
Collection teams are available from the field
army, Technical Intelligence Company, TOE 30 to
34, and/or the cellular teams available from theater army, TOE 30-600.
AGO 3118A
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5-7. Psychological Operations (PSYOP}
Units

Personnel of PSYOP units in support of theater,
field army, corps, and division may lend assistance in special skills ,technical knowledge. and use
of such equipment as radios, televisions, loudspeakers, and printing equipment. The peculiarity
of PSYOP indicates that specific requirements
which such units may fulfill are best met by direct
coordination of technical intelligence personnel
with PSYOP units.

5-8. Strategic Intelligence Elements
The strategic intelligence elements at theater and
field army, in their .research and study effort, develop information which is of value to the overall
technical intelligence effort. Such elements will be
responsive to }?road technical intelligence requirements, mainly those involving higher echelons of
enemy forces.

5-9. Airborne Infantry Ranger Company
Unit$

The extended depths into enemy areas at which
long-range reconnaissance patrols (LRRP) operate provide an opportunity for them to obtain information on new or previously unacquired materiel, locations, estimates of weapons .ranges, and
other technical data.

5-10. Civil Affairs Units
a. The civil affairs organization consists of
staffs, units. and functional teams. Civil affairs
units provide command support or area support to
tactical or administrative units and are. assigned
to support civil affairs operations at specific echelons of command or level of government. The size
and capabilities of civil affairs units and cellular
functional teams may vary; however, the personnel assigned to them are trained specialists who
are technically qualified to provide assistance in
various specialized functional areas which are
considered to be in the normal range of technical
intelligence units. These areas include(1) Food and agriculture.
(2) Public communications.
(3) Public health.
(4) Public transportation.
(5) Civilian supply.
( 6) Public works and utilities.
(7) Commerce and industry.
AGO 3118A

b. Among potential sources for civil affairs
units are:
(1) Civilian technicians among refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons.
(2) Military personnel with technical backgrounds.
( 3) Civilian technicians and scientists associated with foreign governments or forces.
(4) Governmental technical documents, specialized libraries, and archives.
(5) Industrial and scientific records.
(6) Technical blueprints, plans, manuals, or
other information containing technical intelligence in the mobility, communications-electronics,
weapons and munitions, chemical, biological, nuclear /radiological, and medical fields.

c. Direct assistance to technical intelligence
units may be provided by civil affairs units in the
procurement of technical materiel, identification
of foreign technical personnel, and recruitment or
hiring of civilian technicians, scientists, professional people, and skilled craftsmen and laborers.
Civil affairs personnel may procure(1) Civilian equipment.
(2) Medical instruments, drugs, and other
medical supplies.
(3) Civilian motor vehicles, construction
equipment and materials.
( 4) Fuels, lubricants, greases. and propellants

5-11. Engineer Topographic and Terrain
Units

Engineer topographic and terrain units are designated the· responsibility for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of topographic information and terrain intelligence. They normally function at theater, field army, and corps levels, with
the division engineer having the responsibility at
division level. Their special skilis and technical
knowledge in the field of topography and terrain·
intelligence relate closely to many categories ·Of
technical intelligence and may be of assistance in
collection planning as well as in the analysis and
exploitation of foreign materiel and technical documents.

5-12. USASA and Electronic Warfare Units
Technical intelligence units must coordinate all
efforts in the field of communications-electronics
intelligence with the appropriate USA$A and EW
units. USASA is tasked with the timely exploitation of all known or suspected sources possessing
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possible target exploitation (TAREX) or other
technical data. TAREX is a SIGINT activity dealing with the collection of foreign cryptologic documents and information. Other technical data includes foreign communications-electronics equipment characteristics and operating modes derived
from COMINT, ELINT, and ESM activities, as
outlined in FM 32-10, FM 32-20, and AR 10-122.
TARBX personnel are thoroughly conversant
with USASA technical operations requirements
and can brief and lend assistance to technical intelligit::nce personnel in determining proper disposition of materiel of interest to USASA.

5-13. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units
a. General. Technical intelligence personnel
should be familiar with EOD activities and respons:ibilities (AR 75-15, AR 75-14) in view of
the importance of foreign explosive ordnance to
technical intelligence. The danger of fires, explosions, burns, and accidental functioning of explosive ordnance dictates the need for EOD personnel. The possibility that abandoned items may be
boobytrapped requires that such items be disarmed or evacuated. FM 9-6 discusses the recovery and evacuation of ammunition; FM 9-47 contains information on special ammunition. FM
9-14 and FM 9-15 discuss EOD operations and
responsibilities in support of technical intelligence.
b. Foreign Ammunition. Foreign ammunition is
of great value to the intelligence effort. Samples
of ammunition are of major value to the R&D
efforts of the Army, and may also have immediate
tactical significance. Particularly, new or modified
items of foreign ammunition are of great significance. Information on foreign ammunition is invaluable to order of battle intelligence; evaluation
of probable enemy courses of action, capabilities,
and vulnerabilities ; and development of countermeasures. Strategic value may derive from markings, materials used, or the mere fact of existence
of a certain item. Of tactical concern is the knowledge of employment. effectiveness, and possible
countermeasures. Ammunition, duds, components,
and fragments may reveal the type and caliber of
enemy supporting weapons. Recovered sabotage
or boobytrap devices may provide valuable indications of probable enemy courses of action. Manufacturing methods and details of design are valuable to R&D agencies of the Army. Information of
the following items is of value:
(1) New items of enemy explosive ordnance

with complete technical data on construction,
markings, and functioning.
(2) Design or changes in design of known
explosive ordnance.
(3) Changes in manufacturing techniques.
( 4) Quality and type of material and explosive content.
(5) Packing, storage, and maintenance techniques.
(6) Place and date of manufacture.
(7) All documents relating to the foregoing,
including sources or potential sources of information.
(8) All specialized explosive ordnance designed to.simulate small arms, crew-served weap..
ons, and artillery fire for cover and deception.
· c. EOD Operations. Close coordination is essential since technical intelligence personnel must
rely on EOD personnel for disposal and evacuation of explosive ordnance, and conversely. EOD
units are obligated to notify technical intelligence
personnel of the types and locations of new items
of foreign materiel and munitions. Recovery and
evacuation of explosive ordnance and related
items are discussed in chapter 6.
d. Reports. All information collected by EOD
personnel on first-seen foreign explosive ordnance
must be reported immediately through EOD control centers to EOD staff officers. At staff level
such reports will be placed in intelligence channels for distribution to all interested levels of
command. Additional information concerning
technical intelligence reports is found in paragraphs 7-10 through 7-13 and appendix D.
(1) Preliminary Technical Report (PRETECllREP). This report is prepared by EOD per-

sonnel upon recognition of an item of expl_osive
ordnance as an item of technical intelligence
value. It is forwarded by the fastest means available to the. EOD control unit for distribution to
intelligence personnel and other EOD units. A
tentative render safe procedure (RSP) (for EOD
use only) will be included whether it is necessary
to render the item safe or not. When it is necessary to render the item safe, the EOD team
should obtain all essential information prior to
performing a render safe procedure. This report
alerts technical intelligence teams so that they
may be dispatched to the site, and provides other
EOD units with information on new items of explosive ordnance.
{2) Complementary Technical Report (COMAGO SUSA
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TECHREP). These reports are prepared by technical intelligence teams or. in their absence, and
when requested by the G2 or his representative,
by EOD personnel. This report will be as complete
and detailed as possible. When prepared by EOD
personnel, it will be forwarded by the fas test
means available through the EOD control unit to
the technical intelligence company.

metal helmets, and protective masks); military
documents. such as military codes and ciphers;
pictures and maps or sketches of military installations or implements of war; and signal devices.
All other property taken from prisoners is
grouped in the category of retained or impounded
property and must be accounted for or ultimately
returned to the prisoner if the capturing forces
assume custody.

5-14. Military Police Units

c. Marking of PW Materiel. Procedures for
marking foreign materiel of potential technical
intelligence value that is taken from PW should
include means of positively identifying the materiel with the PW (para 6-6, fig 6-2). This is necessary because prisoners and materiel will often
be evacuated through separate channels and accurate identification of the PW will facilitate future
location. This would also facilitate the identification of certain property which must eventually be
returned to the PW by regulations.

a. Collection. As collection agencies, military
police units and personnel, particularly criminal
investigators, are well suited to assist in such
functions as :
(1) Collecting and reporting items of foreign
materiel on the Foreign Materiel Requirements
Listing.
(2) Locating specific technical items of equipment.
(3) Locating individuals and activities
within a specialized technical field.
( 4) Reporting items of potential technical intelligence value obtained from prisoners of war
(PW) and civilian internees.
(5) Reporting items of potential value confiscated or captured in raids.
b. Materiel Obtained by Military Police. The
different items of foreign materiel subject to confiscation from PW include arms; ammunition;
military equipment (except mess equipment,

AGO 8118A

5-15. CBR Reconnaissance Teams
The CBR Reconnaissance Team, TOE 3-500, assigned to an armored cavalry regiment or equivalent echelon and to higher headquarters, has the
primary mission of performing CBR reconnaissance. Additional appropriate information on the
capabilities, composition, functions, and employment of the CBR reconnaissance team may be
found in FM 3-1.
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CHAPTER 6
RECOVERY AND EVACUATION OF FO.REIGN EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS
(STANAG 2084, SOLOG 94)
Section I.

6-1. Concept
a. Within a theater of operations, captured
items are exploited at predesignated collecting
points at division, corps, field army, and theater.
Technical intelligence collection teams are sent
forward of the division collecting points to examine captured items at or near the scene of acquisition and to arrange for evacuation if necessary.
Captured items, except class V, can be evacuated
directly from the division collecting point to the
technical intelligence company at· field army for
exploitation. Collecting points for class V ordnance should be either the conventional or special
ammunition supply points (to include missiles).
FM 9-47 contains information on special ammunition. Detailed information for recovery and
evacuation flow of Class V ordnance is contained
in FM 9-14 and FM 9-15. FM 9-14 provides EOD
services information.
b. The immediate headquarters of the unit finding or acquiring items of foreign materiel and
related documents is responsible to obtain and
provide prompt disposition instructions as to
whether the items will be evacuated through technical intelligence or logistics channels, and to assist the acquiring unit in safeguarding, recovery,
and evacuation of the items, as· required. Technical intelligence elements are responsible to provide prompt jnstructions on the need for, and the
evacuation of, foreign items for technical intelligence purposes. They will perform on-site analysis and are also responsible to exploit, secure, and
store all items of foreign materiel while in technical channels.

Section II.

c. Intelligence officers and staffs at all echelons
are responsible to insure that prompt instructions
concerning the need for, and evacuation of, foreign materiel fo.r technical intelligence are provided to the acquiring unit. They must coordinate
with their logistics counterparts concerning the
policies and procedures governing the recovery
and evacuation of foreign materiel. They also provide supervision over the evacuation of foreign
materiel through intelligence channels.

6-2. Disposal and Transfer
a. Items evaeuated through technical intelligence
channels will be returned to logistics channels
when no longer required for technical intelligence
purposes. Before such transfer, however, a technical intelligence element must ascertain that there
is no further requirement from higher echelons or
other agencies for the item in question.
b. Foreign air and naval materiel and related
technical documents will be transferred to US
Navy or US Air Force technical intelligence or
logistics channels at the lowest practical level.
Until transfer, such items will remain in Army
technical (or logistics) channels, as appropriate.

c. The acquisition of foreign materiel, in itself,
will not necessarily vest title in the United States.
This is true in the case of items acquired incident
to belligerent or peace-keeping operations (e.g.,
acquired by capture or confiscation) where ownership of forj:lign property (materiel) is regulated
by international law. Where there is doubt, the
matter should be referred to the Staff Judge Ad·
vocate.

RECOVERY. AND EVACUATION OF MATERIEL

6-3. Collecting Points
Collecting points are facilities to which abandoned or· unserviceable US and captured· foreign
AGO 3l18A
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materiel is evacuated for classification, segrega..
tion, and proper disposition. Collecting points operate where needed throughout the theater of op-

FM 30-16

erations. In the field army area, one or more collecting points are provided for each corps area
and for the field army service area. These are
generally operated by the Collection and Classification Company (TOE 29-139). In the division
areas, collecting points are operated by the division maintenance battalion. Evacuation fl.ow
through the collecting points is shown in figure
6-1. Detailed information on recovery and. evacuation procedures is contained in FM 29-24 and
29-30.

6-4. Material Recovery
a. Responsibilities for recovery and evacuation
of foreign materiel at various levels are similar to
those for U.S. materiel. The discovery of items of
foreign materiel. however, will be reported by the
capturing unit through intelligence channels ..
Items for which there are no disposition instructions should not be evacuated until coordinated
with technical intelligence elements. The capturing unit must submit a spot report (para 7-10) to
the intelligence officer of its higher headquarters.
The capturing unit may be directed to evacuate
the item to the collection and classification company or guard it and leave it in place for on-site
preliminary examination by technical intelligence
personnel. When materiel does not have to remain
in place for intelligence evaluation and the discovery unit is incapable of evacuating it, the unit
may request evacuation assistance directly from
the command responsible for direct support maintenance. Evacuation may be direct from a maintenance collecting point to the technical intelligence
company at field army.
b. Foreign materiel may be of value for technical intelligence purposes, or it may be utilized by
friendly forces. Foreign materiel should be
cleared from the battlefield or destroyed to prevent recapture or reclamation by the enemy or by
guerrilla forces. Technical intelligence elements of
the military intelligence battalion and the intelligence officers of all commands are interested in
captured or abandoned items of foreign materiel.
Procedures must be established for the screening
and evacuation of materiel. Implementing instructions are published by subordinate commands in
the form of directives and SOP. Items of foreign
materiel being evacuated directly to the field army
support area are reported through higher headquarters to the technical intelligence company and
held until disposition instructions are provided or
responsibility is assumed by the technical intelligence company or another activity. Items which
6-2

are of no use either for technical intelligence or
for equipping friendly forces are demilitarized
and disposed of as directed by higher headquarters. Captured medical materiel may be used to
treat PW and indigenous personnel after such
supplies have been declared safe by US medical
authority.
-

c. Transportation elements of supported units
are responsible for transporting foreign materiel
from collecting points with the assistance of
maintenance units as required, based on instructions from technical intelligence elements.

6-5. On-Site Analysis by Technical
Intelligence Collection Teams

a. The objective of on-site analysis (after foreign materiel is acquired) is to obtain information
of immediate tactical value to combat forces. Onsite analysis also facilitates recovery of certain
characteristics which are more difficult to determine once the configuration and/or interconnection of materiel has been disturbed. Information
to be obtained includes the following:
(1) Determination of equipment operational
characteristics, performance, capabilities, and
vulnerabilities.
(2) Identification of new significant weapons.
(3) Analysis for modifications.
( 4) Possible countermeasures.
(5) Identification and proper handling of radioactive materiel.
b. In the event of acquisition of a large number
of like terms of materiel, the technical intelligence
collection teams must examine the materiel and
obtain all available information relative to lot
numbers, date of manufacture, and factory markings that may assist in providing information ·on
the item. A sufficient number of items must be
evacuated for detailed evaluation. The remaining
items are then processed through normal evacuation and/ or salvage supply channels.

6-6. Marking and Tagging
a. The capturing unit is responsible for tagging
items of foreign materiel. To facilitate segregation, collection, analysis. and evacuation of materiel for intelligence purposes, weather-resistant
equipment tags, normally produced within the
theater, are securely attached to the item itself
and to the shipping container (fig 6-2 and 6-3). If
weather-resistant tags are not available at the
troop level, any materiel may be used as a tag as
AGO 3118A
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long as pertinent capture data can be recorded.
This responsibility must be clearly established by
command SOP.
b. An outgrowth of the capture of foreign
equipment is the need for an effective "war trophy" policy. Care must be taken to insure that
"items wanted" are not retained as souvenirs nor
destroyed unnecessarily by the capturing unit.
Provisions should be made with the host country
to insure that all firearms are properly registered
and conform to existing firearm laws.
c. Equipment tags accompany the materiel to
its final destination. Article 103, Uniform Code of
Military Justice, is printed on the reverse side of
the tag to forestall tampering {fig 6-3).
d. In addition to the establishment of proper
safeguards, all military personnel should receive,
in conjunction with intelligence training, instruction in equipment tagging and in the consequences
of failure to execute this responsibility. Troops
must be indoctrinated not to deface original
markings on materiel at the time of its capture.
e. Tagging, marking, crating, and preparation
for shipment to CONUS is the major responsibility of the recovery and shipping section of the
technical intelligence company in accordance with
field army and theater policies. The section must
depend upon field army support command elements for the preparation and shipment of bulky
items.

6-7. Evacuation Guidance
The general plans, policies, and procedures for
evacuation of all foreign materiel are prescribed
by the joint/unified/theater and field army headquarters. These general plans are based upon DA
and DOD policies and guidance. Each command
echelon within the field army must insure that its
plans are in accordance with field army directives
and the overall field army technical intelligence
plan.

6-8. Recovery and Evacuation of Explosive
Ordnance and CBR Munitions
a. The primary interest of technical intelligence
units in explosive foreign ordnance has been mentioned in paragraph 5-13. However, the assistance
of EOD personnel in the examination, movement,
and evacuation of explosive ordnance is mandatory. First-seen foreign ordnance items should be
rendered safe by EOD personnel if possible. If
this is not feasible, the item should be rendered
safe in place by destructive methods which will
minimize damage to the item. Complete photo-

graphic coverage of the item in place, both before
and after destructive sating should be obtained.
Foreign, explosive-type chemical or biological ammunition, after being rendered safe, is forwarded
through technical intelligence channels to the general chemical laboratory for extraction of samples
of the agent filling. Extracted chemical agent samples are analyzed by the chemical laboratory, and
extracted biological agents samples are forwarded
to a medical laboratory for identification.
b. Unidentifiable items and those required by
higher authority should be recovered whenever
possible, even at considerable risk. Recovery of
components or fragments of such items may be
equally important. Recovery is invaluable to technical intelligence and to CONUS-based research
elements in the development of disposal methods
and tools.
c. The following guidelines apply to the recovery and evacuation of explosive ordnance:
{1) New or unknown types of foreign explosive ordnance recovered by EOD personnel must
be turned over to technical intelligence units for
disposition. Security classification of the items
and their components will not be lower than
SECRET.
(2) Foreign nuclear weapons or components,
to include sabotage devices, are evacuated through
technical intelligence channels. Security classification of such items will not be lower than SECRET
RESTRICTED DATA.
(3) Security and technical escorts are re-.
quired to provide safety control for shipments of
nuclear, chemical, biological, and other hazardous
items of explosive ordnance. Within the field
army, technical intelligence personnel will coordinate with appropriate staffs to establish the need
and arrange for technical escorts. For shipments
to CONUS, the theater intelligence officer determines the need and arranges for technical escorts.
( 4) Collection of technical intelligence data
will in many instances entail dismantling of the
ordnance and stripping of fuzes and other dangerous components for analysis and evaluation.
These operations will be performed only by experienced EOD personnel. Dismantling and stripping are conducted only in response to a specific
requirement for such action which has been
placed through technical intelligence or EOD
staffs.
(5) Captured mines and boobytraps should
be analyzed or tested only by trained weapons/
munitions specialists. Extreme caution must be
exercised when taut wire and pull releases or similar releases are encountered. Unusual mechaAGO 3118A
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Figure 6-2. Equipment marking tag.

AGO 3118.A

6--5

FM 30-16

0

ARTICLE 103, UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE
a. All persons subject to this code
property taken from the enemy for the
States, and shall give notice and turn
thority, without delay, all captured or
their possession, custody or control.

shall secure all public
service of the United
over to the proper auabandoned property in

b. Any person subject to this code who: (1) fails to carry
out the duties prescribed in subdivision {a) of this article;
(2) buys, sells, trades, or in any way deals in or disposes of
captured or abandoned property, whereby he shall receive or
expect any profit, benefit, or advantage to himself or another
directly or indirectly connected with him; or (3) engages in
looting or pillaging; shall be punished as a court-martial may
direct.

Figure 6-9. Reverse side of equipment marking tag-Article 103.
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nisms used as boobytraps should be· reported immediately by the finding unit through intelligence
channels to the technical intelligence company by
spot report. Countermeasures must be coordinated
with EOD personnel. Final disposal of explosive
components or hazardous materials associated
with such devices and with recovered ammunition
is the responsibility of EOD personnel.
6-9. Security and Escort

Many items of foreign materiel acquired by U.S.
Forces and .determined to be of technical intelligence value will require safeguarding in storage
Section Ill.

RECOVERY AND EVACUATION OF TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS

6-10. General

Doctrine for the handling of captured documents
is contained in FM 30-15, Intelligence Interrogation. Technical publications and manuscripts
which are of concern to technical intelligence, are
those documents usually found with materiel
which relate to technical design or operation of
the materiel. Such technical documents may also
be acquired separately from the materiel they
concern (e.g., from PW, from files in overrun
areas, found on the battlefield). It is essential that
technical intelligence personnel coordinate closely
with interrogation elements to facilitate exchange
of information.
·
6-11. Evacuation
a. Technical documents should be evacuated
with the related materiel. If the operational situation prevents evacuation of the materiel, the documents should be identified with the materiel by
means of an attached sheet marked "TECHDOC"
listing the precise location, time and circumstances of capture, and. a description, as detailed as
possible, of the materiel. Adequate and sufficient
photographs of the equipment should be produced
and evacuated with the document.

b. Documents obtained through liaison with interrogation elements should be accompanied by a
report of pertinent information obtained from
PW.

c. The general guidance in this manual concerning recovery and evacuation of materiel pertains
also to technical documents. However, the divers-e
nature of documents acquired and their frequent
interest to various agencies and commands dictate
the necessity for technical intelligence personnel
AGO 311SA

as well as during evacuation. Such items may be
sensitive· due to their criticality or because of a
U.S. classification assigned (para 6-8, 6-12, and
7-13). Initially, the finding unit is responsible for
safeguarding materiel, based on instructions from
the next higher headquarters, to prevent looting,
loss, destruction, or recapture by the enemy. Military police elements normally provide physical security at storage and during evacuation when foreign materiel is sensitive or of special value. Particular attention must be paid to the peculiarities
of nuclear weapons escort and the technical escort
requirement for CBR materiel.

to be familiar with the categories of documents
and appropriate handling procedures stipulated in
FM 30-15.
6-12. Recovery and Evacuation of
Cryptographic and Other Electronic
Equipment and Documents
a. Special provisions must be prescribed by
technical intelligence units for handling all captured communications and electronic equipment
and documents. This equipment and related documents must be classified CONFIDENTIAL or
higher and designated "crypto," and tagged and
evacuated to the nearest USASA element as soon
as practicable. Examples are as follows :
(1) Speech security devices.
(2) Teletypewriter security devices.
(3) Data security devices.
( 4) Off-line encryption devices.
(5) Documents, manuals, circuitry diagrams,
and all ancillary equipment.
b. The following items must be classified
SECRET or higher and evcuated to the nearest
USASA element:
( 1 ) Key lists.
(2) Code books and sheets.
(3) Encrypted messages.
(4) Cryptographic data and items.
(5) Coµimunications-electronics operation instructions.
(6) Communications-electronics standing instructions.
(7) Map coordinate overlays.

c. The following items are of immediate interest
to EW units as well as USASA units and should
6-7
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be classiified in accordance with a or b above.
These ii terms may be evacuated to either USASA
or EW units with the other being informed of the
nature and disposition of the items:
( 1) Communications-electronics operating instructions.

6-'8

(2) Map coordinate overlays.
(3) Order of battle information of enemy
units which operate electromagnetic transmitting
or receiving equipment.
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CHAPTER 7
PROCESSING, DISSEMINATION, AND USE
(STANAG 2084, 2097; SOLOG 94)

Section I.

7-1. General
a. The wide range of technical proficiency necessary for mission accomplishment will not always be found within the technical intelligence
collection elements or the technical intelligence
company. Assistance from medical, ordnance, signal, engineer, and other specialized agencies and
units will have to be sought. Within the technical
intelligence company itself, a coordinated effort of
diverse specialists is necessitated by the broad
range of the technical equipment/materiel
acquired.
b. Processing of technical information involves
recording, evaluation, and interpretation of the
collected information. In urgent situations technical information can be processed as received without waiting to collect supporting information,
particularly if background files and an adequate
data base have been estaiblished and maintained.
For example, information/intelligence containing
data on foreign missiles capable of carrying nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads, the early
use of which is a probability, is so urgent that no
delay between acquisition of the information and
dissemination can be permitted.

7-2. Recording
Technical information and data are recorded in
journals, workbooks, and technical intelligence
files to facilitate evaluation and interpretation.
Recording involves reducing information and data
to written or graphic form and aids technical analysts in grouping related items of information. It
expedites the preparation and dissemination of
technical intelligence reports, however, the recording step may be omitted to permit rapid evaluation, interpretation, and immediate dissemination of urgent tactical information to the unit(s)
concerned.
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7-3. Evaluation
a. Evaluation includes determining the pertinence of the information, the reliability of the
source and the agency from which the information was derived, and the accuracy or credibility
of the information. The system of evaluation is
described in FM 30-5 and has been standardized
for use by NA TO forces and other allies.
(1) Evaluation involves systematically arranging all pieces of information and comparing
known data with the current state of the art, a
continuing process at all appropriate echelons. As
technical information flows to the technical intelligence company, it must be associated with all
related data including previous technical reports.
(2) Technical evaluation must take into consideration the industrial and scientific base and
capabilities of foreign nations. Evaluation estimates based solely on US standards must be
avoided inasmuch as foreign equipment and materiel may appear wholly inferior when judged only
by US standards.
b. Technical information received from intelligence sources and agencies will consist primarily
of reports on the use of new or modified items of
foreign materiel, the capture of materiel and documents, and extracts of technical information
from intelligence reports. These reports normally
will have been given an evaluation by the collecting agency and/or the appropriate intelligence
staff. Such evaluations notwithstanding, technical
intelligence personnel are obligated to re-evaluate
each item of information based on their technical
data base and technical experience.

c. Technical evaluation includes the following
considerations :
(1) Does the information concern foreign
materiel known or suspected to be in use in the
area of operations?
7-1
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(2) Will the information have an immediate
effect on the command mission?
(3) Is the use of new materiel by the enemy
indicated, or are increased enemy capabilities
indicated?
(4) What is the immediate effect on forces in
combat?
(5) Does the information have present or future value; if so, to whom?
7-4. Interpretation

Interpretation consists of analysis, integration,
and deduction. It is the mental process of determining the importance of information, integrating this with other technical data, and making a
deduction as to the value and significance of the
information.

a. AnaTysis. Analysis requires a thorough
knowledge of foreign equipment and materiel to
include past technological trends, developments,
and tactical doctrine on equipment use. It involves
more detailed research as the volume of technical
date increases. Analysis within the technical intelligence company is centralized in the evaluation
and analysis platoon.
b. Integration.
(1) Integration is the combining of numerous
isolated elements of technical information with
other technical data to form one or more logical
conclusions. Technical intelligence conclusions are
made with pri.mary emphasis upon the tactical
Section 11.

c. Deduction. Deduction, the last step in interpretation, consists of deriving meaning from the
hypotheses that have been developed and tested.
Deduction provides answers as to the meaning
and significance of technical intelligence and data
in relation to the tactical situation and area of
operation.

7-5. Processing by Intelligence Staff
Sections

The processing discussed above does not replace
the normal intelligence processing within the G2
staff elements. Technical intelligence is integrated
with all other intelligence by the G2 staff and, as
one facet of the intelligence product, enables the
G2 staff to arrive at an estimate of the capabilities, limitations, and future courses of action of
foreign military forces. It is re-emphasized that,
as in all steps of technical intelligence production,
close coordination between the technical intelligence company and the organic technical intelligence element of the G2 staff is mandatory.

ASPECTS OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE. PRODUCTION

7-6. Considerations
a. The producers of technical intelligence must
keep in mind that actual and potential foreign
capabilities, limitations, and probable courses of
action are under continuous development at the
field army, theater, and national levels. Based
upon the technical intelligence produced, new requirements for US equipment, doctrine and countermeasures may evolve. Intelligence that will assist in the preparation of new US military equipment, doctrine, and countermeasures must be considered by the technical intelligence producer during the entire technical intelligence production
cycle.

b. Factors to be considered by tactical technical
intelligence units and staff officers include, but ar:e
not limited to, the following :
(1) Effects of terrain and weather.
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m1ss10n. This phase of interpretation requires
judgment, experience, varied background knowledge, and knowledge of scientific methods. Formulated technical hypotheses (conclusions) should be
tested for validity and reliability.
(2) The technical intelligence company must
integrate the technical information provided by
all intelligence collection agencies to construct an
objective assessment of foreign capabilities.

(2) Characteristics, performance, and effectiveness of materiel.
(3) Effectiveness of countermeasures against
foreign equipment.
(4) New design features and modifications of
old and/or new equipment.
(5) Overall combat intelligence requirements.

7-7. Technical Reference Library
a. Technical intelligence processing, research,
analysis, and evaluation cannot be conducted
without a current data base. The need for specific
data requirements, performance characteristics,
equipment descriptions, and operational limitations of materiel, and the extensive need for integration and collation of technical information covering wide technical areas necessitate the estabAGO 8118A
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lishment of a technical intelligence reference library by the technical intelligence company. As a
minimum, the technical library should include-(1) Technical Bulletins.
(2) Foreign Equipment Handbooks (by country).
(3) Foreign Materiel Catalog (FOMCAT)
TB 381-5-series.
(4) DIA Scientific and Technical Intelligence
Registers.
(5) Organizational and Logistical Data
Handbooks.
(6) Enemy tactics and operational concept
studies.
(7) Technical equipment documents and
studies.
(8) Order of battle handbooks.
(9) Foreign Tables of Organization and
Equipment.
(10) Foreign materiel exploitation reports.
(11) Equipment vulnerability studies.
(12) Threat studies and assessments.
b. This technical reference library will provide
not only accurate and timely technical information and intelligence references, but will serve to
aid interested field army units and agencies with
limited and specialized technical information and
thereby· reduce the need for direct technical support. Selection of library references should be
based on the needs of combat, combat support,
and combat service support users and field army
requirements.

7-8. Use of Experts and/or Organizations
a. The technical intelligence company will sometimes require assistance from military and/or
civilian personnel or organizations to assist in the
technical analysis of materiel to fulfill a special
tactical or strategic mission. This may occur when
the expertise needed to solve a highly technical
and complex problem is not available within the
technical intelligence company. Therefore, maintaining an up-to-date "Technical Expert File" (of
names) will prove invaluable. When utilized, these
"experts" should work directly with the technical
intelligence company, and must possess the proper
security clearance; they should be used as consultants/ advisers for a short period of time. The most
important criterion governing the use of these individuals is that such service should normally be
voluntary.
b. Experts whose training could be of special
AGO 3118A

assistance to technical intelligence units for analysis and production services include- .
(1) Ammunition maintenance technicians.
(2) Guided missile maintenance personnel.
(3) Nuclear weapons specialists.
( 4) Ammunition supply specialists.
( 5) Data processing personnel.
(6) COMINT, ELINT, ESM, and ECM personnel.
(7) Cryptographic personnel.
(8) Communications security analysts.
(9) Optical specialists.
(10) Explosive ordnance. specialists,
(11) Petroleum product analysts.
(12) Guided missile propellant and explosive
specialists.
(13) Geographers, geologists, and/or construction specialists.
(14) Photography experts.
(15) Communications specialists.
(16) Weapons systems analysts.
(17) Chemists, physicists, and biologists.
(18) Radar specialists.
(19) Indigenous surgeons and medical specialists.
(20) Transportation operations and movements specialists.
(21) USASA TAREX personnel.
(22) Cover and deception personnel.
(23) Counterdeception personnel.

7-9. Photography
a. Photographs, diagrams, and charts (valuable
sources of permanent information for technical
analysis and evaluation) are used by technical intelligence analysts to supplement their finished reports. Photographs of materie1 acquired in fastmoving tactical situations can be sent to the rear
by technical intelligence collection teams prior to
evacuation of the actual equipment. The photograph may be the only item available to the analyst if the equipment becomes lost, damaged, destroyed, or recaptured. Technical intelligence
collection activities at all echelons must be cognizant that one of their first responsibilities should
be to photograph, diagram, or sketch in place all
items of intelligence value. As many different angles as possible should be portrayed.
b. Photographs must be analyzed, evaluated,
and compared. They should be accompanied by
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appropriate written descriptions to enhance their
value to the analyst. Skill and training of the analyst are essential to maximum exploitation of photographs. All photographs should contain a ruler,
scale, or other measuring comparison to portray
relative size of an object.
c. Long-range reconnaissance patrols, special
Section Ill.

forces operational detachments, and other intelligence collection elements may photograph special
items of technical intelligence interest when operating behind enemy lines. Use of such units for
technical intelligence missions must be coordinated at the appropriate echelon, and personnel
must be thoroughly briefed on technical intelligence requirements prior to dispatch.

TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

(6) Name of the commander of capturing

7-10. Reports

Six types of technical intelligence reports are used
in technical intelligence collection and production.
These area. Spot Report. This oral or written report (FM
30-5) is prepared by the acquiring units and/or
intermediate command echelons to report rapidly,
by electrical or other means, the acquisition of
foreign materiel and technical documents. Such
reports are forwarded through intelligence chan~
nels to the technical intelligence company. Corps
may use this report as a basis for dispatch of
technical intelligence collection teams if none are
in the acquisition area. The basic items of this
report should include as a minimum :
(1) Who is reporting (unit).
(2) What is being reported.
(3) Where and when (coordinates).
( 4) How much materiel.
(5) Condition of materiel.
(6) Whom to contact.
b. Preliminary Technical Report
(PRETECHREP). This report is prepared and transmitted by the quickest possible means through
intelligence channels on all captured foreign materiel. It is prepared by corps technical intelligence
collection teams or the capturing unit. The preliminary report contains a general description of
the equipment and places emphasis on alerting
tactical units to significant technical information
of immediate tactical importance. It is prepared in
the format shown below:
(1) Date found, location (map reference).
(2) Type of equipment and quantity.
(3) Origin.
(4) Brief description with distinguishing
marks.
(5) Technical characteristics with an immediate value.
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unit.
(7) Time and origin of the message.
(8) Tentative RSP (for EOD use only).
c. Complementary Technical Reports (COMTECHREP). These reports are prepared by technical intelligence collection teams operating
throughout a corps area in support of corps elements and supplements information in the PRETECHREP. The formats of these reports are given
in appendix D. When the situation does not permit
Air Force technical intelligence teams to arrive at
the scene of captured or downed enemy aircraft
prior to destruction, recapture or loss; Army technical intelligence personnel will initially examine
and submit COMTECHREP Type A. This report
will then constitute the only information which
can be provided to Air Force technical intelligence.
In the event items of enemy navy materiel are
acquired, Type A report format can be modified
for reporting such acquisition.
d. Detailed Technical Report (DETECHREP).
This report is the responsibility of the technical
intelligence company at field army. No format can
be specified because of the diversity of its content.
e. Technical Document Report (TECHDOC).
This report is prepared on all captured enemy
technical documents such as maintenance handbooks, operation manuals, drawings, and sketches.
No format is prescribed.

f. Special Technical Report. This report is prepared as required by field army G2 staff elements
and higher echelons to provide input to studies
and plans. It contains special information on
items of significant intelligence interest. No format is prescribed and content is governed by the
nature of the technical intelligence desired.
7-11. Nomenclature
All technical intelligence report nomenclature
should be, to the extent possible, in consonance
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with overall unified/joint/theater policies and
guidance. Nomenclature for Soviet Bloc army
weapons has been NATO-standardized (STANAG
2097). Principles of this nomenclature are as follows:

e. The items to be included in the title of each
group of weapons and equipment, as well as examples of these titles are shown in appendix E.

a. Nomenclature of the country of origin for
Soviet Bloc army weapons, equipment, and vehicles is used whenever it is known. If unknown, a
short descriptive title will be devised '.lnd used as
an interim measure only. Short interim titles will
be issued by higher headquarters (theater, joint,
or unified command) as soon as possible after
sighting details have been received. Description
titles, as well as interim titles, should include the
country of design and manufacture (when the
country of manufacture is different from the
country of design) or the best estimate thereof;
should include a question mark after the country
name, when appropriate; and should become progressively more speicific. e.g.:

All reports produced by the technical intelligence
company should bear the following statement on
the cover to give official credence to the report:

(1) E. German ( ?) Hand Grenade M 1960.
(2) E. German copy of Sov Hand Grenade
M 1960.
(3) E. German copy of Sov HEAT Hand
Grenade M 1960.
(4) E. German copy of Sov HEAT Hand
Grenade A.KG-3.
When the manner in which information was obtained warrants protection of a confidential
source or method, the originating (reporting)
agency will assign an appropriate security classification.

b. Nomenclature for any given piece of equipment will include an adequate description to
show:
(1) The role of the equipment, e.g., medium
tank, howitzer, antitank gun.
(2) Type of chassis, when applicable (assumed to be wheeled unless otherwise stated),
e.g., half-tracked, tracked.

c. The caliber of all weapons will be referred to
in millimeters and will always be placed immediately preceding the description of the weapon.
The abbreviation "mm" for millimeters will be
used.
d. The year when the equipment was first seen
or known to exist will be indicated by use of the
letter M and the four figures of the year. These
figures will become a part of the title, e.g., 100mm field Gun M 1964.
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7-12. Report Credibility

This is a United States Army Technical
Intelligence Report. The data contained
herein was derived through limited testing, analysis, and examination utilizing
US Army Laboratory and test facilities.

7-13. Security Considerations
a. Classification. Technical reports from the
technical intelligence company are classified in
accordance with appropriate Army regulations in
the 380-series. When equipment is acquired
through a friendly foreign government, the specific security classification assigned by that government must be adhered to and given equivalent
protection by being assigned to Group-1 in accordance with AR 380-6.

b. Security Policies.
(1) At times, technical intelligence involves
sensitive security materiel and will require stringent security controls by the technical intelligence
unit. A unit technical intelligence SOP on security
is mandatory in order to provide a security
framework adequate to support operational requirements. The technical intelligence SOP must
be precise, yet flexible. The following guidelines
are provided :
(a) Requirements for sensitive technical
intelligence materiel in support of assigned missions must be carefully planned and should be
revised periodically.
(b) Information and materiel should be
disseminated on a need-to-know basis in accordance with specific security regulations.
(c) Care must be taken not to ove·rclassify.
(2) Indigenous personnel may be utilized in
some situations. Because of the sensitive nature
of many areas of technical intelligence, information should be released to such personnel only
after:
(a) It has been determined that release of
the information is in the best interests of the
United States.
( b) The security requirements imposed by
security regulations and procedures have been
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complied with concerning release of sensitive information.
( c) Care has been taken to furnish only
Section

IV.

DISSEMINATION AND USE

7-14. Dissemination
a. Methods. Timely dissemination of technical
intelligence reports is of maximum importance to
tactical, combat support, and combat service support commanders. The methods used to disseminate technical intelligence depend upon the detail
and urgency of the intelligence and upon the intended users. Primary consideration must be
given to the needs of the tactical users. The spot
report, PRETECHREP, arid COMTECHREP are
used normally for initial reports of acquisition of
materiel and supplementary information. The
most common means of disseminating processed
technical intelligence are:
(1) Detailed technical reports.
(2) Technical intelligence bulletins.
(3) Technical reviews and summaries.
(4) Special technical reports.
(5) Special technical studies and estimates.
(6) Handbooks.
( 7) Technical pamphlets.
( 8) Briefings.
(9) Liaison visits.

b. Dissemination of Explosive Ordnance Information. Technical intelligence on explosive ordnance may be disseminated from any level where
it originates. Pertinent extracts should be provided to EOD personnel at all levels to permit
development of new EOD tools and render safe
procedures, as required. EOD control units will
insure that pertinent information contained in
PRETECHREPS and COMTECHREPS is disseminated to each EOD unit under its control and
to other EOD control units if appropriate. The
Foreign Science and Technology Center, US Army
Materiel Command, makes available foreign ammunitiOn items, reports, and evaluations required
for study and use in developing EOD tools and
render safe procedures. Secrecy of EOD tools and
render safe procedures is important to prevent
the enemy from learning the development of
effective disarming procedures.
7-15. Use of Technical Intelligence
a. The user units and agencies are even more
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that information for which an explicit need-toknow has definitely been established.

diverse than the technical fields concerned. It is
beyond the scope of this manual to specify even
the general requirements of various units and
agencies. The requirements for higher echelons,
intelligence staff sections, and commanders have
been discussed. All units and agencies must familiarize themselves with the capabilities and limitations of technical intelligence, and must insure
that their technical intelligence needs are made
known to higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters. The advantages of coordination and liaison
to insure receipt of pertinent technical intelligence reports and information cannot be overemphasized. Technical intelligence personnel of units
and intelligence staffs must develop f amiliarization with the technical needs of the many different units. It must also be recognized that it is a
rare technical item that is of interest to only one
unit or agency.
b. Examples of specific technical intellfgence interests are as follows :
(1) Combat arms unit commanders have a
continuing interest in all implements of war
which may be used against the front line Soldier.
Examples of items of particular interest are new
weapons and ammunition, communications equipment, offensive or defensive devices or weapons,
boobytraps, antihelicopter devices, grenades, antitank weapons and fortifications, and enemy armor
characteristics. It is obvious that some or an of
these items will also be of interest to civil affairs
units, EOD, and others.
(2) S2/G2 and military intelligence· units
have a continuing interest in any enemy innovations. To produce accurate intelligence estimates
and summaries for the commander, the latest
enemy capabilities and technical battlefield advancements must be of prime interest.
(3) SIGINT/ESM units have a continuing
interest in obtaining technical intelligence. The
planning and conduct of COMINT, ELINT,
SIGSEC, and EW requires detailed information
concerning the technical characteristics of the
enemy electromagnetic environment, the doctrinal
aspects concerning employment and deployment
of enemy forces, and the current operational environment.
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CHAPTER 8
STABILITY OPERATIONS

Section I.
8-1. General
a. The scope of insurgent warfare may encompass elite and professionally trained military
forces as well as local guerrillas or part-time fighters rind noncombatants. There will be substantial
differences in armament, organization, training,
equipment and overall effectiveness. Technical intelligence collectors and analysts must recognize
these differences in their analyses. Familiarity
with insurgent tactics, doctrine, and organization
will greatly enhance the technical analysis and
evaluation capabilities of the technical intelligence
unit.
b. Technical intelligence personnel must be
thoroughly familiar with the characteristics, ca·pabilities, and performance of the small arms and
weapons originating in many friendly and unfriendly nations. The insurgent usually has a limited capability to perform modifications to weapons and materiel. If these modifications are not
carefully analyzed and evaluated, their significance and the conclusions drawn can be misleading. Technical intelligence derived during stability
operations often has serious national and political
consequences; it must, therefore, be accurate.

8-2. Special Censiderettions
a. Technical intelligence emphasis, goals, and
priorities in stability operations will differ
slightly from those in limited and general conflict.
The basic principles of technical intelligence remain unchanged. However, some procedures may
vary and additional considerations will be necessary in applying these principles. Military units,
for example, may be dispersed for independent/
decentralized operations. Movement of technical
intelligence personnel must be by the fastest
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INTRODUCTION
means available. Evacuation of foreign materiel
must be performed by the most secure means
available, usually by air, to prevent recapture or
loss. The insurgent's materiel normally is less sophisticated in the early phases of internal conflict
than that of a conventional enemy; their weaponry consists primarily of small arms, automatic
weapons, and mortars obtained from friendly,
neutral, and hostile nations. Such equipment is
often augmented by primitive, but nevertheless
effective, weapons such as crossbows, mantraps,
and sharpened stakes.
b. Arms caching and weapons smuggling are
frequently resorted to by the insurgent. Arms
caches may be of political and tactical significance. Arms caches and logistical stores should be
carefully analyzed and evaluated for technical intelligence, usually in a combined effort with the
host country. The discovery of arms caches, when
carefully exploited by functionally integrated
technical teams, may lead to valuable intelligence
about the overall insurgent tactical situation.
Normally all captured materiel becomes the property of the host country, and for this reason combined operations, liaison, and coordination are im~
portant to insure full exploitation. The disposition
of foreign materiel may be governed by status-offorces or other agreements, thus complicating the
collection and analysis problems. As in a conventional situation, close coordination of technical intelligence personnel with military units and all
U.S.· government departments and agencies engaged in collection is important. Combined (US/
host country) technical intelligence operations are
particularly effective in improving the overall
collection capability due to the language ability
and area knowledge of the host country military
personnel.
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Section II.

RESPONSIBILITIES

8-3. Technical Intelligence Emphasis
a. In stability operations, technical intelligence

have been transferred to another enemy unit with
greater need for the specific item.

personnel perform the normal duties described
for conventional operations, but particular emphasis must be placed on the following:
(1) Training host country combat personnel,
as necessary, in technical intelligence collection
and evacuating procedures.
(2) Coordinating technical intelligence matters with other services having a technical intelligence interest and with the host country.
(3) Assisting in the organization and development of a host country technical intelligence
capability, if required.
( 4) Performing increased on-site technical
intelligence analysis and evaluation of enemy materiel.
(5) Providing technical advice and assistance
to host country military technical intelligence personnel, as required.
(6) Assisting in adapting ideas and techniques of insurgents for use by US Forces.

8-4. Role of the Unit Intelligence Adviser
a, The intelligence adviser plays a basic role in
technical intelligence collection. He coordinates
host country requests for technical intelligence
support, and provides technical intelligence
advice. He also informs US intelligence staffs
when significant discoveries of insurgent materiel
or arms caches are made by the unit which he
advises. Technical intelligence collection/analyst
personnel must keep the unit intelligence adviser
informed of important guerrilla weaponry devel·
opments. In addition, they must help the adviser.
in maintaining a technical intelligence items
wanted list.

b. Equally important for the technical intelligence analyst and the intelligence community is
the ever-present danger of capture of friendly
weapons and equipment. An examination of the
serial numbers of recaptured weapons will reveal
which friendly unit lost the item; when, and possibly to whom. The movement of the enemy unit
may possibly be traced. .Coordination throughout
the intelligence community will assist in determining whether the item was held by the capturing enemy unit because of obvious and known
needs for the materiel or whether the item might

Section Ill.
8-6. General
a. Prior to initial commitment of US combat
forces, the early detection and identification of
materiel used by hostile forces assume paramount
importance. Identification of outside logistical
sources of supply is imperative and assists in the
determination of diplomatic action, overall strategy, force structure, and military equipment which
should be deployed for successful mission accomplishment.
b. The capabilities and knowledge of US Mili-
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b. Since the unit intelligence adviser is responsible for advising and training host country forces
in all aspects of intelligence, to include technical
intelligence, a mutual fl.ow of technical information between the adviser and advisee is ·highly
advantageous. Mutually defined goals and objectives between adviser and advisee are essential.

8-5. Combat Service Support Role
If and when the insurgency movement progresses,
technical intelligence becomes more conventional
in its support of tactical operations. Technical intelligence also assumes its normal role in combat
service support. The establishment of a combined
US and host country technical intelligence center
may become advisable. In this event, the channeling of technical intelligence reports and dissemination of processed technical intelligence should
be precisely established by SOP.

PROCEDURES
tary Attaches, Military Assistance Advisory
Groups, or Military Missions present in a foreign
country experiencing insurgency can supplement
the technical intelligence data base and facilitate
initiation of the U.S. military technical intelligence collection and analysis effort.

8-7. Analysis
a, Technical intelligence collection and analysis
becomes more complicated in stability operations
inasmuch as the combined political or military
AGO SllSA
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objective often is more than merely seizing and
holding terrain. Information on the technical
characteristics of insurgent weapons must be continuously updated and expanded as the weapons
or modifications appear. When a blockade is used
to stop the flow of arms and ammunition to the
insurgent, technical intelligence analysts must be
particularly thorough in collection, analysis, and
evaluation. For example, supply shortages and
small changes in the chemical composition of propellants and demolitions might be indicators of
the potential effectiveness of the blockade.
b. It is imperative for political/military purposes that technical intelligence personnel keep
abreast of outside military assistance furnished
the insurgent such as modern air defense missiles,
guns, propellants, communications-electronics
equipment, and petroleum products. For example,
analysis of new missile propellants may give vital
indications of enemy tactical capabilities.

8-8. Investigative Data
a. The technical intelligence collection teams
have a responsibility to conduct weapon and ammunition cache investigations and make reports
thereon. Numerous caches, depots, salvage points,
and small. factories may be discovered over a period of time and should be exploited to the extent
possible. The weapons and ammunition discovered
may be a mixture from numerous nations, and
statistical data must be maintained on all weapons, ammunition, and supplies captured or found
by US and friendly forces.
b. One of the most important problems facing
technical intelligence specialists will be planning
for the exploitation of arms caches. Priorities
must be established with primary consideration
given to tactical needs. If the number of caches
discovered is so great as to cause the involvement
of all technical intelligence specialists, exploitation of caches will have to be on a selective basis.
The entire analysis effort can be materially assisted by proper troop orientation on all aspects
of technical intelligence, close coordination with
major tactical headquarters, and placement of emphasis on the items wanted list.

c. Tunnels and excavations are frequeptly used
by the insurgents to provide protection for personnel and supplies and may contain a wide variety of potential intelligence information that
should be collected. The fallowing checklist should
be used by tactical units in submitting tunnel information reports :
AGO 3118A

(1) Location (coordinates).
(2) Evaluation of construction.
( 3) Specialized underground areas (class.
room, training).
(4) Installation of communications facilities.
(a) Internal to internal.
( b) Internal to external.
( c) Use of special antennas.
(5) Power available.
(6) Alternate/emergency power system.
(7) Storage facilities (effect of weather on).
(8) Assessment of construction quality of internal operational facilities (shops, toolmaking,
repairs).
(9) General assessment of health facilities.
(a) Waste disposal.
(b) Water facilities.
(c) Contamination.
(d) Care of sick and wounded.
( e) Assessment of medical standards.
(10) Assessment of training facilities (if applicable).
(11) Measures taken against severe weather.
(12) Assessment of political propaganda indoctrination (documents, newsposters, magazines,
printing presses).
(13) Evaluation of use of environmental resources.
(14) Evaluation of local/commercial resources (lumber, cotton).
(15) Special items of interest.
(16) Recreation facilities.
(17) Assessment of defensive areas.
(18) Internal security or warning devices.
(19) Assessment of intelligence or intelUgence-related activities.
(20) New field expedients (of major and constant interest).
(21) Neutralization action (i.e., destroyed,
partially destroyed, contamination with CS).
d. Information on the use of primitive weapons,
such as poisonous spikes, crossbows, and deadfalls, must be widely disseminated together with
appropriate countermeasures.

8-9. Logistical System
Although the logistical system of the insurgent
may be rudimentary and primitive, the technical
intelligence analysts may be required to deal with
a variety of commodity items for intelligence pur-
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poses (e.g., salt rations, agricultural products,
primitive drugs, and serums). The capability of
the insurgent's logistical system to support ·sustained military operations may be determined in
part through technical analysis of commodity
items.
8-10. Combined Operations

a. A major problem of technical intelligence is
the acquisition of the necessary language skills
and experience to perform technical analysis and
evaluation of technical equipment in a foreign
country. Therefore, combined operations with the
host country forces are usually imperative. Host
country military personnel who possess some limited technical training are· used to assist in overcoming language and area problems.
b. Indigenous technical intelUgence personnel
who are thoroughly familiar with the culture and
environment of the insurgent are an asset to the
analysis, evaluation, and collation of certain types
of technical data and information. For example,
the habits of guerrillas living in underground tunnels may be useful in evaluating and updating
important technical data. Classrooms, billets, hospitals, and stored materiel may be indicators to
valuable intelUgence.

c. Civil affairs units may assist in the acquisition of necessary, linguistic and technically qualified civilian personnel. In stability operations,
civilians having technical knowledge may come
under civil affairs control, especially upon liberation of an area from insurgent control. Their
evacuation for interrogation purposes may not be
desirable because of the attitude of the civil population at the time. However, the civil population
may be screened by US or host country civil affairs units or police elements. When civilians having technical skills are identified as possible contributors to technical intelligence, they should be
referred to technical intelligence elements.
d. Military police, in the course of conducting
their normal police functions, develop and exchange police intelligence with other police agencies in the area of operations. Insurgents, enemy
agents, and enemy military teams often engage in
criminal type actions as a means of accomplishing
their mission. These actions may include murders,
robberies, black-marketing, riots, counterfeiting
of currency, and smuggling. Such actions are normally considered to be violations of civil law.
'fherefore, the indigenous police are the logical
forces to engage in the initial investigation of

these acts. Insurgent property and data of technical intelligence value may be uncovered during
such investigations.
e. Coordination and close liaison with US and
allied intelligence organizations may result in the
acquisition of additional information of technical
intelligence value. A concerted effort should be
made to establish and maintain friendly and cooperative relations with these intelligence organizations.

8-11. Strike Operations
a. An important characteristic of stability operations is the extensive use of strike operations.
These offensive operations include encirclement,
pursuit, raid, sweep, and coordinated attack.
Strike operations are terminated by withdrawal
from the operational area upon mission accomplishment ; the holding of terrain is not emphasized.
b. Technical intelligence collection teams coordinating with tactical units must emphasize to such
units that the destruction of potentially valuable
technical materiel and facilities should, when possible, be avoided during strike operations. Technical intelligence personnel must continually brief
tactical elements on current items wanted lists
and other items of significant intelligence interest.
Proper planning, implementation, and dissemination of the operations order can minimize the loss
of potential intelligence in all aspects of stability
operations.
8-12. Airborne Infantry Ranger Company
a. The airborne infantry ranger company has a
limited capability to acquire and exfiltrate small
portable items of enemy materiel. Technical intelligence requirements, however, should not interfere with primary patrol missions.
b. Airborne infantry ranger companies of the
corps or their equivalent command structure will
have an extensive use for technical intelligence.
Special technical reports and data should be furnished for special missions. The nature of the
LRRP (airborne infantry ranger company) mission may necessitate observation, identification,
and rep.orting of enemy materiel over a period of
3 to 5 days. Such missions require as background
the most current technical information and data.
Prior to dispatch of the airborne infantry ranger
company on certain special missions, technical intelligence personnel may be requested to provide a
general technical briefing on foreign materiel that
AGO SUSA
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will facilitate accurate identification of enemy
materiel which may be observed or used by the
enemy to detect such patrols.

8-13. Psychological Operations
a. Psychological operations are widely used in
an insurgency environment. The discovery of insurgent propaganda equipment requires analysis
by a functional team consisting of supply, chemical, and equipment personnel to analyze the printing presses, chemicals, inks, and paper being used.
Such analysis is necessary to assess guerrilla
methods and determine sources of supply. Communications-electronics specialists can assist
PSYOP personnel in the analysis of loudspeakers
and radio broadcasting equipment.
b. The technical intelligence aspects of operable
foreign radio_ and television stations and printing
facilities are important in furthering the field
army PSYOP capability. Such installations and
facilities should be turned over to civil affairs,
PSYOP units, and communications-electronics
specialists for maximum exploitation.

c. Radio broadcasting and printing facilities
can be used to further enhance the overall technical intelligence effort. Specific items of equipment
desired can be advertised with an offer of monetary reward to potential defectees.

8-14. Boobytraps and Mines
a. Explosive mines and boobytraps are used
widely by the insurgent for harassment of mili-
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tary operations. It is essential that technical intelligence specialists keep abreast of these munitions
developments. The employment of explosive ordnance materiel must be analyzed on a continuous
basis. For example, duds can easily be modified
and used as boobytraps.
b. The weapons and munitions specialists, in
coordination with EOD personnel, can provide the
following principal information when such weapons and tactics are used :
(1) Fragmentation radii.
(2) Modifications to boobytraps and mines.
(3) Construction of locally manufactured
mines.
( 4) Principal fuzing systems (pressure, pull,
chemical).
(5) Types of munitions (bomb, grenade, artillery, mortar).
( 6) Fuze ingredients and structures.
(7) Modifications to fuzes.
(8) The use of "commercial devices" or materiel.
(9) Foreign manufactured items used in
mines and boobytraps.
(10) Use of triggering devices (battery or
blasting machines) .
(11) Use of chemical time-delay devices.
(12) Use of large bombs.

c. Dissemination of technical intelligence concerning boobytraps and mines should include
countermeasures training data.

8-5
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APPENDIX B
MAJOR CATEGORIES OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE
Major categories of technical intelligence interest
used for planning purposes include:

B-1. Weapons
a. Guns, all sizes
b. Chemical weapons and equipment

c. Launchers, rocket and pyrotechnic
d. Camouflage and deception equipment

e. Miscellaneous weapons

B-2. Atomic Ordnance
a. Implosion systems
b. Gun-type systems
c. Thermonuclear systems
d. Fuzing and firing devices

e. Guided missile warheads and explosive components
f. Rockets and rocket ammunition
g. Landmines
h. Underwater mines
i. Military chemical agents
j. Pyrotechnics
k. Explosives, solid propellants and explosive
devices
l. Military biological agents
m. Fuzes and primers
n. Miscellaneous ammunition

B-5. Guided Missiles
a. Guided missiles, complete

e. Nuclear components
f. High explosive charges, propellants, and detonators
g. Specialized test and handling equipment

b. Guided missile components
c. Guided missile remote control systems
d. Launchers, guided missile
e. Guided missile handling and servicing equipment

B-3. Fire Control Equipment
a. Fire control directors

B..-6. Aircraft and Airframe Structural
Components

b. Fire control computing sights and devices

c. Fire control systems, complete
d. Optical sighting and ranging equipment
e. Fire control stabilizing equipment
f. Fire control transmitting and receiving
equipment
g. Aircraft gunnery fire control components
h. Aircraft bombing fire control components
i. Fire control sonar equipment
j. Miscellaneous fire control equipment

B-4. Ammunition and Explosives
a. Ammunition for guns, all sizes
b. Ammunition for mortars

c. Bombs
d. Grenades
AGO 3118A

a. Aircraft, fixed wing
b. Aircraft, vertical takeoff and landing
c. Aircraft, rotary wing
d. Air cushion vehicles
e. Aircraft, lighter than air
f. Gliders
g. Drones

B-7. Aircraft Components and Accessories
a. Propellers
b. Landing gear
c. Wheel and brake systems
d. Auxiliary fuel tanks
e. Hydraulic, vacuum, and deicing systems
f. Air-conditioning, heating, and pressurizing
equipment
B-1
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g.

Aerial delivery equipment

h. Miscellaneous aircraft accessorl.es and com-

ponents

B-8. Aircraft Launching, ·Landing, and
Ground Handling Equipment

a. Aircraft arresting, barrier, and barricade
equipment
b. Aircraft launching equipment
c. Aircraft ground servicing equipment
d. Airfield specialized trucks and trailers

B-9. Space Vehicles
a. Space vehicles. complete
b. Components
c. Remote control systems
d. Launchers
e. Handling and servicing equipment
f. Space survival equipment
B-1 O. Ships, Small Craft, Pontoons, and
Floating Docks
a. Barges and lighters, special purpose
b. Boats

c. Dredge!!
d. Miscellaneous vessels.
B-11. Ship and Marine Equipment

a. Deck machinery
b. Marine hardware and hull items
c. Buoys
d. Miscellaneous ship and marine equipment
B-12. Railway Equipment

a. Locomotives
b. Railcars
c. Right-of-way construction and maintenance
equipment, railroad
d. Locomotive and railcar accessories and components
e. Track materials, railroad

B-13. Motor Vehicle, Trailers, and Cycles
a. Passenger motor vehicles
b. Trucks and truck-tractors
c. Trailers
d. Motorcycles, motor scooters, and bicycles
e. Tanks
f. Self-propelled weapons
B-2

g.

Armored vehicles

h. Snow vehicles
i. Amphibious vehicles

B-14. Tractors
a. Tractors, tracked
b. Tractors, wheeled

B-15. Vehicular Equipment Components
a. Cab, body, and frame structural components
b. Power transmission components
c. Vehicular brake, steering axle, wheel, and
track components
d. Furniture and accessories
e. Miscellaneous vehicular components

B-16. Tires and Tubes
a. Tires and tubes, pneumatic
b. Tires, solid and cushion

B-17. E.ngines, Turbines and Components
a. Engines, gasoline
b. Engines, diesel
c. Engines, steam, reciprocating
d. Engines, steam, turbine
e. Water turbines and water wheels
f. Gas turbines and jet engines
g. Rocket engines and components
h. Miscellaneous engines and components
-e-1

a.

Engine Accessories

a. Fuel systems
b. Electrical systems
c. Cooling systems
d. Air and oil filters, strainers, and cleaners
e. Turbosuperchargers
f. Miscellaneous engine accessories

B-19. Mechanical Power Transmission
Equipment

a. Torque converters and speed chargers
b. Gears, pulleys, sprockets, and transmission
chain
c. Belting, drive belts, fan belts, and accessories
d. Miscellaneous power transmission equipment

B-20. Bearings
a. Bearings, antifriction, unmounted
AGOJ!118A
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b. Bearings, plain, unmounted
c. Bearings, mounted

c. Blocks, tackle, rigging, and slings
d. Winches, hoists, cranes, and derricks

e. Elevators and escalators

B-21. Woodworking Machinery and

f. Miscellaneous materials handling equipment

Equipment

a. Sawmill and planing mill machinery
b. Woodworking machines
c. Tools and attachments for woodworking
machinery

8-22. Metalworking Machinery
a. Cutting equipment
b. Finishing equipment
c. Welding equipment
d. Forming equipment
e. Tools, portable
f. Machine tool accessories
g. Machine shop sets, kits and outfits

B-23. Service and Table Equipment
a. Laundry and dry cleaning equipment
b. Industrial sewing machines and mobile tex-

tile repair shops
c. Miscellaneous service and trade equipment

B-24. Special Industry Machinery
a. Food products machinery and equipment
b. Gas generating equipment
c. Miscellaneous special industry equipment

B-28. Rope, Cable, Chain, and Fittings
B-29. Refrigeration and Air-Conditioning
E.quipmenti

a. Refrigeration units
b. Air-conditioning units
c. Fans and air circulators

B-30. Fire Fighting, Rescue, and Safety
Equipment

a. Fire fighting equipment
b. Marine lifesaving and diving equipment
c. Decontaminating and impregnating equipment
d. Safety and rescue equipment

B-31. Pumps and Compressors
B-32. Furnace, Steam Plant, Drying
Equipment, and Nuclear Reactors

B-33. Plumbing, Heating and Sanitation
Equipment

8-34. Water Purification and Sewage
Treatment Equipment

8-35. Pipe, Tubing, Hose and Fittings
B-25. Agricultural Machinery and Equipment
a. Pest, disease, and frost control equipment
b. Miscellaneous agricultural machinery and
equipment

B-36. Valves
B-37. Maintenance and Repair Shop
Equipment

B-38. Handtools
B-26. Construction, Mining, Excavating, and
Highway Maintenance Equipment
a. Earth moving and excavating equipment
b. Shovels, crane-shovels and cranes
c. Mining equipment
d. Road-clearing and cleaning equipment
e. Truck and tractor attachments for construction activity
f. Miscellaneous construction equipment

B-27. Materials Handling Equipment
a. Conveyors
b. Trucks and trailers
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B-39. Measuring Tools

B-40. Hardware and Abrasives
B-41. Prefabricated Structures and
Scaffolding
a. Prefabricated and portable buildings
b. Bridges, fixed and floating
c. Storage tanks
d. Miscellaneous prefabricated structures

8-42. Lumber, Millwork, Plywood and
Veneer

B-43. Construction and Building Materials
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B-44. Communication Equipment
a. Telephone and telegraph equipment
b. Teleprinters and facsimile equipment
c. Radio and television communication equipment
d. Radio navigation and direction finders
e. Intercommunication and public address systems
f. Sound recording and reproducing equipment
g. Radar equipment
h. Infrared communication equipment
i. Electronic countermeasures equipment
B-45. Electrical and Electronic Equipment
Components
B-46. Electric Wire, Power, and Distribution
Equipment
a. Motors
b. Generators and generator sets, electrical
c. Transformers, distribution and power station
d. Converters
e. Batteries
f. Wire and cable, electrical
B-47. Lighting Fixtures and Lamps
B-48. Alarm and Signal Systems
B-49. Medical, Dental, and Veterinary
Equipment and Supplies
B-50. Instruments and Laboratory Equipment
a. Navigational instruments
b. Measuring and testing instruments
c. Laboratory equipment and supplies
d. Optical instruments
e. Meteorological instruments
f. Hazard detecting instruments
g. Drafting, surveying and mapping instruments
h. Combination and miscellaneous instruments
B-51. Photographic Equipment

B-52. Chemicals and Chemical Products
B-53. Training Aids and Devices
B-54. Furniture1
B-55. Food Preparation and Serving
Equipment
B-56. Office Machines and Data Processing
Equipment
B-57. Books, Maps, and Other Publications
B-58. Musical Instruments, Phonographs, and
Home-type Radios
B-59. Cleaning and Finishing Equipment and
Supplies
B-60. Containers, Packaging and Packing
Supplies
B-61. Textiles, Leathers and Furs
a. Fabrics
b. Tents and tarpaulins
B-62. Clothing and Individual Equipment
a. Outerwear
b. Footwear
c. Badges and insignia
d. Individual combat equipment
e. Personal armor ·
f. Specialized flight clothing and accessories
B-63. Toiletries
B-64. Agricultural Supplies
'B-65. Live Animals and Foodstuffs
B-66. Fuels, Lubricants, Oils, and Waxes
B-67. Nonmetallic Fabricated Materials
B-68. Nonmetallic Crude Materials
B-69. Metallic Crude Materials
B-70. Ores, Minetals, and Their Primary
Products
B-71. Miscellaneous
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APPENDIX C
EXAMPLE OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PLAN

(CLASSIFICATION)
Copy No.
Thirtieth Army
HEIMERSHEIN, (595120) Germany
100930 July 19_
Appendix _ _ _ _ to Annex _ _ _ _ (Intelligence) to Operation Order.
1. General
a. References.
b. Purpose and scope.
c. Period covered.
d. Subordinate elements required to support similar plans.
e. Priorities.
2. Organization
a. Intelligence Agencies (at each echelon).
(1) Organization.
(2) Functions.
(3) Subordinate agencies functions.
(4) Supporting agencies.
(5) Liaison and coordination.
b. A subparagraph for each functional area of technical intelligence
as it relates to paragraph 2c.
(1) Weapons-munitions.
(2) Communication-electronics.
(3) Supply and equipment.
( 4) Chemical.
<5) Mobility.
( 6) Medical.
c. Each technical intelligence team should know the following:
(1) Mission.
(2) General organization.
(3) Functional team structure.
(4) Allotment of technical intelligence personnel.
(5) Specific functions and responsibilities.
(6) Location of collecting points at each echelon.
(7) Availability of chemical and medical laboratories in the
theater.
3. Personnel
a. Military policies concerning:
(1) Responsibilities of capturing unit.
(2) Handling captured enemy materiel.
(CLASSIFICATION)
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(CLASSIFICATION)
(3)
(4)
(5)
necessary.
(6)
(7)
area.
(8)
(9)

Handling abandoned equipment.
Handling technical facilities and installations.
Authority for destruction of captured materiel when
Taking custody of enemy materiel from capturing units.
Technical intelligenee collection team operations in forward

Preliminary examinations and analysis.
Reports to be rendered.
(a) To tactical units.
(b) To technical intelligence company.
(10) Coordination and liaison with combat intelligence personnel.
(11) Equipment evacuation.
(12) Markings and tags.
b. Civilian
(1) Policies concerning civilians in an area of military operations
having a technical knowledge.
(2) Limitations on activities of individuals and groups.
(3) Policies concerning evacuation of civilian personnel.
(4) Interrogation of civilians having a technical knowledge.
4. Direction
a. Important policies governing overall technical intelligence collection and analysis (trophies, souvenirs, theater policies).
b. Amplification of items wanted lists.
c. Special technical intelligence targets.
d. Policies governing publishing requirements.
e. Support to be provided by the field army and its subordinate
support elements (i.e. F ASCOM, general and direct support elements).
f. Additional support requirements necessary and by whom rendered.
g. Preparing EEI and other intelligence requirements.
h. Host country agreement (if applicable).
5. Collections
a. Documents
(1) Procedures.tor collecting technical documents.
(2) Forwarding and handling of technical documents.
(3) Responsibilities for translation of technical documents.
(4) Responsibilities for analysis, evaluation, and dissemination
of technical data.
(5) Handling of timely technical data.
(6) Channels for forwarding.
b. Prisoners
(1) Procedures for selecting personnel with technical knowledge.
(2) Responsibilities of interrogator personnel.
(3) Technical intelligence cooperation with interrogators and
other combat intelligence personnel.
(4) Handling of military personnel with technical knowledge.
(5) Handling of civilian personnel with technical knowledge.
(6) Channels for evacuation.
(7) Ultimate disposition (civilians, defectees).
(8) Reports to be rendered.
(CLASSIFICATION)
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(CLASSIFICATION)
c. Materiel
(1) Specific unit responsibilities.
(2) Examination policies.
(8) Evacuation channels.
(a) Primary.
(b) Alternate.
(4) Destruction policies (authority to determine whether a target
should be destroyed).
(5) Policies in regard to significant new equipment.
(6) Sensitive or classified equipment.
(7) Safeguarding.
(8) Marking.
(9) Ultimate disposition.
d. Facilities and Installations.
(1) Procedures for collecting, analyzing, and reporting informa-

ti on.
(2) Areas of primary overall intelligence and technical intelligence interest.
(3) Channels for forwarding facilities data.
(4) Disposition and dissemination of facilities data.

6. Processing
a. Records and/ or files required to be maintained.
b. General policies governing preparation of technical reports.
(1) Preliminary reports (PRETECHREPS).
(2) Detailed technical reports (DETECHREPS).
c. Liaison and coordination between personnel of the technical intelligence company and other intelligence elements concerning evaluation and
interpretation of technical information.

7. Dissemination
a. Scope.
b. Content.
c. Editorial assistance.
d. Types of reports.
e. Special reports.
f. Policies governing dissemination.
8. Functional and Task Force Operations
a. Theater and/or theater army policies.
b. Scope and priorities.
c. Effort that may be expended on missions.
d. Additional support sources if needed.
e. Procedures for collecting and reporting data.
f. Responsibilities for direction of operations.
g. Limitations on units and individuals.
h. Security.

(CLASSIFICATION)
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( CLASSIFICAT'ION)
i.

Safeguarding components of intelligence value.
j. Host country agreement.
JONES
General
Distribution : C
OFFICIAL
/2/S.S. SMITH
Smith
G2

(CLASSIFICATION)
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APPENDIX D
HANDLING AND REPORTING OF CAPTURED ENEMY
1
EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS
(STANAG 2084)

D-1. Agreement
It is agreed that the NATO Armed Forces are to use the procedure detailed in Part One for the handling
of captured enemy equipment and associated technical documents and in Part Two for handling captured
enemy documents. It is further agreed to use the item list of equipment and the description and procedure for these reports in Section II (Part One-Part Six). Nothing in this Agreement is to prejudice
any national right on the equipment proper.
D-2. Definitions
For the purpose of this Agreement, "document" is defined as any recorded information regardless of its
physical form or characteristics including, but not limited to, all:
a. Written material, whether hand written, printed or typed.
b. Painted, drawn or engraved material.

c. Sound or voice recordings.
d. Printed photographs and exposed or printed film, still or motion pictures.

e. Reproductions of the foregoing, by whatever process produced.

i The following STANAG is presented in the original English translation. The STANAG reflects the latest approved amendments; only the section,
part and paragraph numbering has been changed.
·
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PART ONE
HANDLING OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT AND
ASSOCIATED TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS

D-3. General'

a. Captured Enemy Equipment (CEE) and Associated Technical Documents. CEE and associated
technical documents are to be handled for exploitation with the minimum delay through the following
processing channels. 2
(1) Preliminary screening and reporting for information of immediate tactical value by national
units assigned to NATO.
(2) Secondary screening and complementary reporting by special intelligence support teams <Technical Intelligence Teams).
(3) Detailed exploitation by specialists in the rear area.
b. Technical Intelligence Reports and Documents. The technical intelligence reports and documents
considered are:
(1) PreU-minary Technical Reports (PRETECHREP) (submitted by the capturing unit). Section
II, Part Two.
(2) Complementary Technical Reports (COMTECHREP) (submitted by Technical Intelligence
Teams). Section II, Parts Three, Four and Five.
(3) Detailed Technical Reports (DETECHREP) (submitted by specialists as appropriate).
(4) Captured Enemy Technical Documents (TECHDOC) (Maintenance Handbooks, Operation
Manuals, Drawings, etc.).

c. National Army, Navy and Air Technical Intelligence Teams. National Army, Navy and Air Technical Intelligence Teams should be provided to carry out the examination of captured enemy equipment
:for the information of immediate tactical value (where no requirement exists for a permanent Naval
Technical Intelligence Team, such groups may be set up on an ad hoc basis). They should be in a position to:
(1) Receive at the earliest possible moment any Preliminary Technical Reports.
(2) Prepare and transmit the results of Complementary Technical Reports.
(3) Dispatch items of equipment for specialist examination at base or to the captured equipments
depot (which are to be established at a minimum of one per Army Group).
(4) Liaise with prisoner of war (PW) interrogation units.
( 5) Ensure that new equipment in possession of a PW is examined as soon as interrogation units
have finished with the items concerned. Full use should be made of voluntary information which the
PW may give. (See STANAG 2033) 8
(6) Receive from intelligence channels all copies of technical documents which may assist them in
their examination.
d. Technical Intelligence Teams should as far as possible be independent or organic to the units earmarked or assigned to NATO and be sufficiently flexible to cater for a variety and number of equipments. They need to be equipped with suitable tools, transport and facilities for compiling and sending their reports from the field. Suggested allocation for these teams is given in Section II, Part Six.

e. Specialist Team. Specialist Teams are required to carry out the more detailed examination of captured enemy equipments to supplement the more superficial data which can be obtained in the field. Such
items should be in a position after their examination to render the Detailed Technical Repor.'-. No suggested allocation is given for these teams as they are dependent on national resources available.
• A detailed list of the types of CEE to be processed is given in Section II, Part One.
•Items of equipment taken from the PW to be examined, which according to Article 18 of the 3rd Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, must
be left with the PW, must be replaced by equivalent items serving the same purpose (see STANAG 2044).

D-2
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D-4. Handling of CEE by Capturing Unit

a. Units locating enemy equipment of intelligence value are to submit the Preliminary Technical
Report listed in Section, Part Two. This report is transmitted by the accelerated intelligence reporting
procedures when it contains intelligence information which could have an immediate effect upon the
current situation. Reports not containing such information are transmitted by the quickest possible
means, with the precedence as deermined by the commander initiating the report. These reports contain a general description of the equipment and any technical information of immediate tactical
importance.
b. Unit Commanders are responsible for placing the CEE under guard in order to prevent looting,
misuse or destruction before the arrival of the Technical Intelligence Teams.

c. Marking of Technical Documents. All technical documents are to be clearly tagged or otherwise
ident.ified so as to avoid defacing and marked "TECHDOC" by the capturing unit or appropriate agency.
In the normal exploitation of captured documents, the Command concerned can provide duplicate copies
for the guidance of all Technical Intelligence and Specialist Teams in their examinations. All such copies
should accompany captured equipment until technical exploitation is finalized.
D-5. Handling of CEE by Staffs and Technical Intelligence Teams

a. The command concerned is to notify the appropriate Technical Intelligence Team, which arranges to
examine the CEE, either on the spot or nearby where better fi.eld facilities may exist. (See Section II,
Part Six.)
b. Having completed the field examination, the relevant parts of the Complementary Report are completed and sent through normal staff channels. The description of such equipment and any additional
information of tactical value as can be extracted is sent directly to such headquarters as is specified by
NATO Authorities. The formats of these reports are given in Section II, Parts Three, Four and Five.
D-6. Handling of CEE by Specialists
a. Arrangements should then be made for the speedy evacuation of the equipment to the rear areas
where suitable facilities exist for a detailed examination of the equipment by specialists.

b. This enables the completion of a Detailed Technical Report. No illustration is given of this type of
report in view of the great variety of equipments involved. It should, however, follow the pattern already
used by national technical exploitation agencies. Such reports are submitted as soon as possible by specialists through the same channels as those laid down for Complementary Reports. If directed, national
intelligence agencies should also be informed after either the Complementary or the Detailed Technical
Reports have been forwarded.

c. In the case where the capturing nation is not in a position to conduct an exhaustive field or rear area
exploitation of the equipment, the appropriate NATO Authority advises the capturing nation as to
further action. In these cases, the exploitation agency should inform the capturing nation of the results
of that exploitation.

AGO 8118A
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PART TWO
HANDLING AND REPORTING OF CAPTURED .
ENEMY DOCUMENT'S
D-7. General
a. Captured Enemy Documents (CED). CED, except those belonging to CEE (TECHDOC) or reproductions thereof, are forwarded for exploitation to the appropriate "Captured Document Centre" (CDC).
These centres are, as a rule, organic to Major NATO Commands. Captured documents are sent with the
minimum delay through the following processing channels:
(1) National units assigned to NATO for preliminary screening for information. of immediate tactical value.
(2) Special intelligence Support Teams for CED for. secondary screening, reproductions and dissemination to all concerned.
(3) CDC for detailed exploitation and indexing.
b. Categories of CED. CED are to be divided as follows:
<1) Category "A.'' Category "A" documents are those which contain information concerning significant intelligence subjects, such as enemy order of battle, the employment of new weapons, and equipment by the enemy, his logistic situation (stock levels, shortages, supply systems, especially supply
systems for missiles), his morale, his losses, etc. Such documents require immediate operational exploitation, and the originals or microfilm copies must reach appropriate operational intelligence staffs at the
earliest possible moment.
(2) Category "B." Category "B" documents are cryptographic documents, all encrypted items and
all documents relating to enemy radio systems. These.documents must reach the appropriate intelligence
staffs ,at the earliest possible moment.
(3) Category "C." Category "C" documents are those of lesser intelligence value.
( 4) Category "D/' Category "D" documents are those which contain no information of intelligence
value.
D-8. Handling of Captured Documents by the Capturing Unit

a, Captured documents must be forwarded without delay by the capturing unit to the staff under
which the unit is operating, with details of the date, time and place of capture (with map coordinates),
together with the name of the capturing unit and the circumstances under which the documents were
found.
b. Marking of CED. Documents are to be clearly tagged, or otherwise identified so as to avoid defac·
ing, by the capturing unit in the following way:
(1) Identification L~tters. Documents are to be ta:gged showing the nationality of the capturing force
by the national identifying letters prescribed in STANAG 1059.
(2) Designation of Capturing Units. This' is to include the service to which the unit belOngs.
(3) Serial Number. Units are to give each document a serial number and should record the dispatch of the document in a war diary.
(4) Date-Time of capture.
(5) Place of capture (with map coordinates) .
. (6) Summary of circumstances under which the document was found.

c. ·In cases where documents are discovered by personnel of NATO staffs and units, and not by national
forces assigned to or earmarked for NATO, then the identification letters to be used are ''NA.'' Other
instructions in b above, however, apply.
d. Whenever intelligence derived from a captured document is included in a unit or information intel-

ligence report, the identification letters and number of the document concerned are to be quoted to avoid
subsequent false confirmation.
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D-9. Handling of CED by Intelligence Staffs and Special
Intelligence Support Teams
a. AU captured documents must be categorized and forwarded. The detailed procedures for handling
captured documents include the following main tasks:
(1) Screening.
(2) Recording.
(3) Translation.
(4) Reproduction.
(5) Dissemination.
b. Intelligence staffs must ensure that there is no delny in the exploitation of captured documents. If
for any reason, qualified personnel or microfilming facilities are temporarily not available or are insufficient to handle the volume or type of documents concerned, the documents are to be forwarded immediately to the next higher echelon and are not to be retained by the staff in question.

c. Methods of Handling Documents. The staff concerned are to handle the documents in one of the following ways:
(1) Category "A."
(a) Where microfilming facilities exist, they are to photograph documents with attached comments, and forward original documents direct to either the national agency or the appropriate NATO
Intelligenc·e Support Unit for exploitation, by-passing intermediate headquarters. Where suitable linguists are available, microfilms are to be examined for information of tactical value to local commanders.
(b) Where microfilming facilities do not exist, but suitable linguists are available, they are to
examine documents for information of tactical value to local commanders, attach appropriate comments, and forward without delay ·to the appropriate higher headquarters.
( c) Where linguists are not available within the formation headquarters, the documents should go
to the PW interrogators for evaluation.
(d) If the marked document is a map or chart, the nearest geographic staff, survey units or topographical section is to be informed of its existence, giving its scale and series, edition identification and
date, if possible:
(2) Category "B." Thes·e are to be forwarded without delay to the Naval, Army, or Air Force
Headquarters whic]vare primarily interested. The NATO International Headquarters under which the
capturing unit operates should be informed of the capture and disposition of important documents in this
category as soon as possible.
·
(3) Cate.gory "C." The staff concerned are to forward Category "C" documents direct to the appropriate NATO Int.elligence Support Unit for exploitation. Exceptions to this procedure include:
(a) Unmarked maps and charts and their source materials (e.g., geodetical and geophysical data
and air photographs after interpretation) which are to be forwarded through the normal channels to the
nearest geographic staff, survey unit or topographical section responsible for the areas concerned. Additional copies may be retained to meet operational needs if necessary.
(b) Personal mail and paybooks taken from a PW, which are to be returned to the PW after
exploitation by interrogation personnel or intelligence staffs.
(c) Other documents acquired from a PW which, after they have served their purpose in interrogation, are to be forwarded to the appropriate intelligence staffs for further exploitation.
( d) Documents specifically related to equipment which, if of intelligence value, are to accompany
the equipment to the intelligence agency responsible for exploitation and then sent without delay to the
CDC.
.
(4) Category "D." Captured documents are not to become final as Category "D" until they have
been thoroughly scrutinized by document translation specialists at the highest command ·echelon interested, preferably at least two levels above division. Category "D" documents are to be disposed of as
directed by appropriate authority.
d. Documents of the Categories "A," "B," "C" and "D'' captured from crashed enemy aircraft or, in
particular, related to enemy antiaircraft defense or enemy control and reporting systems, are to be transA.GO 3118A
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mitted t(} the nearest air force headquarters without delay. The same procedure applies to all captured
maps and charts of enemy air forces. After evaluation by the responsible air force intelligence staff
they are to be transmitted to the topographical or other appropriate unit. Documents taken from a ship,
including Category "B" code books, call signs, frequency tables, identification symbols, etc., should be
forwarded without delay to the nearest naval force headquarters.

e. As a general rule, Maintenance Handbooks, Operation Manuals and drawings should accompany the
captured equipment until the intelligence exploitation is completed.
D-10. Handling of CED by CDC
a. Lists of documents which have been exploitated are to be distributed to all intelligence staffs by the
CDC to avoid duplication in translating and processing identical documents by different units. A master
list of all captured documents which have been exploited in NATO commands is to be maintained.
,
b. When action on captured documents at CDC has been completed, the original documents are sent to
the national staff whose forces captured them.

D-11. Implementation of the Agreement
This STAN AG will be considered to have been implemented when the necessary orders/instructions putting the procedures detailed in this Agreement into effect have been issued to the_ forces concerned.

AGO 8118A
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Section II.
PART ONE.

ANNEXES TO STANAG 2084

TYPES OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT

D-12. Equipment
Types of enemy equipment to be collected and examined by Technical Intelligence Teams. (New equipment or equipment in the process of development {"significant equipment") are the main concern of
these teams.) 4
D-13. Armr Equipment
a. Guided missiles.
b. Ammunition, all types including mines demolitions, pyrotechnics, and
chemicals
c. Infantry weapons
d. Sabotage equipment
e. Armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs)
f. Military vehicles excluding AFVs
g. Artillery, including antitank, antiaircraft and field rocket weapons
h. Guided missile launching systems
i. Engineering, amphibious and river crossing equipment
j. Electronics, infra-red detection and communication equipment
k. Airborne equipment
l. Special weapons, including nuclear, biological and chemical warfare
equipment, flame and incendiary weapons, equipment for dispersion of
chemical and biological warfare agents, together with protective devices
m. Miscellaneous equipments:
( 1) Camouflage equipment
(2) Clothing and personal equipment
(3) Medical equipment
(4) Rations

TYPE B
} See Part Four

TYPE C
See Part Five

D-14. Air Force Equipment

a. Aircraft, airframe and power plant
b. Airborne armament and ammunition, bomb sights, gun sights and
photographic and other sensors and associated equipment
c. Airborne communications-electronics equipment
d. Airborne sea mine countermeasures
e. Miscellaneous airborne equipment, including instruments and controls, dinghies, parachute and other safety equipment
f. Ground equipment and installations
g. Fuels, lubricants, greases and propellants
h. Guided missiles and associated equipment
i. Equipment for dispersion of chemical and biological warfare agents
j. Miscellaneous equipments:
(1) Flying clothing equipment, including G-suits, pressure breathing
equipment etc.
(2) Medical equipments and flying rations

TYPE A
See Part Three

• Although cryptographical material is not specifically mentioned in the above lists, technical intelligence teams also are responsible :f'or the collection of such material. Special instructions for the handling of this equipment are to be issued by the appropriate NAT'() Command.
AGO 3118A
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D-15. Navy Equipment 5
a. Ships.
b. Missiles and launching systems.
c. Shipboard ordnance, including guns, fire control equipment, i.e., radar, range finders, stable elements, range keepers, spotters' telescopes, gun mounts and turrets, ammunition hoists, rammers, fuses,
fuse setters, recoil mechanisms, ammunition, ammunition stowage facilities; ahead thrown weapons of
all types, including Hedgehogs, Mousetraps, Weapon "A" equivalents, Limbo types, depth charge racks
and "Y" and "K" gun launchers; torpedoes and torpedo tubes, including Anti-submarine Warfare
(ASW) launchers; rockets and rocket launchers.
a.. Sea mines (all types, including moored, bottom and floating; contact and influence).
e. Mine Countermeasures.
f. Harbour defence equipment, including nets, booms, alerting devices, net tenders and ASDICS.
g. Navy electronics, infra-red, detection and communication equipment, sonars, fathometers and sonobuoys.
h. Fuels, lubricants, greases and propellants.
i. Special weapons, including chemical warfare equipment, flame and incendiary equipment for dispersion of chemical and biological warfare agents, together with protective devices such as clothing,
gas masks and canisters; salt water spray deck washing equipment for AER protection.
j. Medical supplies and medical instruments.
k. Demolition and sabotage equipment, UDT equipment (sleds, masks, etc.).
l. Naval engineering systems, including main propulsion machinery, steam or gas turbines, boilers,
diesel engines, auxiliary equipment including motor generators, heat exchanges, pumps, evaporators, fuel
oil systems for boilers and diesel engines including fuel pumps and fuel oil heaters; pressure gauges,
boiler accessories including safety valves, propellors, hull zincs, refrigerating machinery, submarine storage batteries and their ventilating equipment, amm Jters, voltmeters, amp/hr meters; steering engines,
engine room telegraph systems, submerged atmospheric gas analyzers, C02 scrubbers, compressors, and
ship's underwater logs; samples of metals used in shipbuilding and any information (description) of
welding techniques used in shipbuilding.
m. Hydrofoil and hovercraft, small boats and boat handling equipment, life rafts and signal apparatus
or any of their components such as hydrofoil foils.
n. Anchors, chains, windlasses, winches, fuelling and transfer at sea rigs, and cargo handling gear.
o. Hydrographic survey ship's equipment, including high altitude research rockets and their launching equipment, sonars and fathometers, sea bottom sampling gear such as drags and coring equipment,
deep sea anchors, sea current measuring devices, biological sampling equipment, Nansen bottles, possible
helicopters and other equipment such as laboratory instruments.

5

Where no requirement exists for permanent Naval Technical Intelligence Teams, such groups may be set up on an ad hoc basis.

D-8

AGO SUSA

FM 30-16

PART TWO.

PRETECHREP

D-16. Procedures

To be submitted by accelerated intelligence reporting procedures immediately following the acquisition
of significant enemy equipment (see paragraph D-4a).
a. Date found, location (map reference).
b. Type of equipment and quantity.
e. Origin.
d. Brief description with distinguishing marks.
e. Technical characteristics with an immediate value.
f. Signature of the commander of capturing unit.
g. Time and origin of the message.

,,AGO 3118A
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PART THREE.

COMTECHREP-TYPE A

D-17. Data
To be submitted by the fastest available means immediately following initial examination of enemy aircraft.
a. Date and location of crash and map of reference.
b. Type of aircraft and:
( 1) Overall length.
(2) Overall wing-span.
c. Identification and distinguishing marks.
d. Type of engine(s) and condition.
e. Cause of crash; number, location and calibre of projectile strikes; condition of aircraft.
f. Armament:
(1) Guns of all types, installation positions, quantity.
(2) Ammunition and number of magazines.
(3) Bombs and bomb installations.
( 4) Mines and mine carriers.
( 5) Rocket projectiles and carriers.
(6) Pyrotechnics, number and type.
g. Armour-plate: quantity, positions, thickness, strikes, penetration.
h. Number of crew and fate.
i. Wings and control surfaces: leading edge, if protected against balloon cables by cutters, strengthening or other special devices; de-icing.
j. State if samples are obtainable of:
(1) Gasoline.
(2) Oil.
( 3) Coolant.
(4) Hydraulic fluids.
( 5) Deicing fluids.
k. Internal equipment: state condition and whether bombsights, radio, photographic and other sensors
and associated equipment and electronics equipment and instruments are standard. If not, specify modifications, alterations or omissions. Obtain radio frequency setting, if possible.
l. Landing gear: type and condition.
m. General remarks and special points or unusual features not mentioned.
n. Name plates photographed:
( 1) Airframe.
(2) Engine.
(3) Others.
o. Other information.
p. Name of officer in command of Technical Intelligence Team making examination.
q. Time and origin of msesage.

D-10
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PART FOUR.

COMTECHREP-TYPE B

D-18. Ammunition
COMTECHREP TYPE B is used for reporting information about ammunition; missiles, bombs, shells,
rockets, projectiles, mines, torpedoes, etc. To be submitted by the fastest available means immediately
following initial examination. Only use those letters for which information is available.
a. Nationality, designation and mark number.
b. Description. ·
c. Overall length of missile, includir.:g fuze, tail, vanes and fittings.
d. Maximum diameter of missiles.
e. Shape and design of missiles (streamlining shells).
f. Length and width of tail.
g. Span of vanes.
h. Thickness of casing at nose.
i. Thickness of casing at sides.
:i. Thickness of casing at base.
k. Material of body.
l. Material of tail or vanes.
1n. Colour and marking of body.
n. Colour and marking of nose.
o. Colour and marking of tail or vanes.
p. Weight and nature of main filling.
q. Total weight of missile.
r. Method of suspension.
s. Detonation system.
t. Fusing systems and markings.
u. Antihandling or boobytra·p devices.
v. Method of propulsion.
w. Date and location of missile.
x. Other information.
y. Name of officer in command of the Technical Intelligence Team making examination.
z. Time and origin of message.

AGO 8.11SA
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PART FIVE.

COMTECHREP-TYPE C

D-19. Description of Captured Equipment

To be submitted with 72 hours following the acquisition of an item of captured equipment not covered
under Types A and B.
a. Date found, location (map reference).
b. Type of equipment and quantity.
c. Origin.
d. Description with distinguishing marks (additional details).
e. Conditions of equipment.
f. Technical characteristics of immediate tactical
value (additional details).
g. Recommended disposal.
h. Name plates photographed.
i. Photographs taken.
j. Other information.
k. Name of team chief.
l. Time and origin of message.

D-12
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PART SIX.

TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE TEAMS

D-20. NATO Forces
Army and Air teams should be provided by national forces assigned to NATO to the extent deemed necessary and preferably on the following minimum basis.

a. Where forces concerned are operating on one front or on a peninsula (Norway, Denmark, Italy,
Greece) : two army and two air teams.
b. Where forces concerned are operating on two fronts on, a peninsula (Turkey): two army and two
air teams per front.

D-21. Naval Teams
See paragraph D-3c regarding naval teams.

D-22. Composition
It is recognized that as these teams are to be furnished on a national basis, their composition will be
partly determined by national characteristics. However, the following composition of army and air teams
is suggested as a standard in order to give adequate technical intelligence support to the fighting forces:

a. AirTeam
<l) Airframe-engine equipment.
(2) Armament.
(3) Communications-electronics.
( 4) Administrative-photos, reports, transport and equipment.
(5) Guided missile ordnance.
b. ArmyTeam
( 1) Vehicles, tanks.
(2) Engineering equipment.
<3) Armament.
( 4) Radio..electronics.
(5) Guided missile ordnance.
(6) Administrative.
(7) Nuclear-biological-chemical specialist.

AG0.3118A
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APPENDIX E
NOMENCLATURE FOR SOVIET BLOC ARMY WEAPONS
1
AND EQUIPMENT
(STANAG 2097)

Section I.

DETAILS OF AGREEMENT

E-1. Agreement
The NATO Armed Forces agree to use the nomenclature of the nation of
origin for Soviet Bloc Army weapons, equipment and vehicles whenever
this nomenclature is known.

E-2. Descriptive Titles
a. When the nomenclature of the nation of origin is NOT known a short
descriptive title is to be devised and used as an interim measure only.
b. These short interim titles are to be issued by SHAPE as soon a.s
possible after the sighting details have been received from national/NATO
sources. When reporting new items to SHAPE national/NATO sources
should suggest a possible interim title, formulated as detailed in the subsequent paragraphs. Interim titles should:
(1) Include the nation of design and manufacture (where this is
different from the nation of design) or the best intelligence estimate
thereof.
(2) Include a question mark after the national name when appropriate.
(3) Become progressively more specific, e.g.
(a) E. German ( ?) Hand Grenade M 1960.
(b) E. German copy of Sov Hand Gr-enade M 1960.
(c) E. German copy of Sov HEAT Hand Grenade M 1960.
(d) E. German copy of Sov HEAT Hand Grenade A. KG-3.

E-3. Protection of Sources
When the manner in which information was obtained clearly warrants protection of a confidential source or method, the NATO nation providing the
information is to assign a security classification which .remains binding
on all recipients until the classification is removed by the originating
authority.

E-4. Description
The nomenclature for any given piece of equipment is to include an adequate description to show the:

a. Role of the equipment, e.g. medium tank, howitzer, antitank gun.
b. Type of chassis where applicable, e.g. half tracked, tracked or wheeled
including types of wheel arrangement.
1 The following STANAG is presented in the original English translation. The STANAG reflects the latest
approved amendments; only the section, part and paragraph numbering has been changed,
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E-5. Weapon Calibers

a. The calibre of all weapons are to be referred to in millimeters and
always placed immediately preceding the description of the weapon or
figures indicating the year of sighting.
b. The abbreviation mm for millimeters is always to be used.

E-6. Date of First Sighting or Evidence of Existence
a. The year when the equipment was first seen or known to exist is to be
indicated by the use of the letter Mand the four figures of the year. These
figures become part of the title, e.g. 100 mm Field Gun M 1964.
b. It is possible that more than one new equipment of a similar type
may be sighted in any one year. To distinguish between the various types a
numerical suffix is to be applied to the sighting date, e.g. M 1962/1,
M 1962/2, M 1962/3.

E-7. Examples of Titles
The items to be included in the title of each group of weapons and equipment, and examples of these titles, are shown in Section II.
E-8. Implementation of the Agreement
This STANAG will be considered to have been implemented when the necessary orders/instructions have been issued directing the forces concerned
to put the content of this Agreement into effect.
Section II.

TITLES OF GROUPS OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT
NATION OF ORIGIN-

Type of equipment

Small arms
Infantry antiaircraft (AA) weapons
Infantry antitank (AT) weapons

Items in title

Caliber
Description
Sighting year

Examples

7.62mm Pistol M 1964
12.7mm AA Machine Gun M 1963
82mm AT Launcher M 1964

Hand grenades ---------------------- If antitank (AT)
Sighting year

Hand Grenade M 1964
AT Hand Grenade M 1964

Artillery --------------------------- Caliber
Description
If self-propelled (SP)
Sighting year

lOOmm Field Gun M 1964
152mm SP Gun M 1965

Rocket launchers -------------------- Caliber
Description
Number of rounds
Sighting year

240mm Rocket Launcher
(16-round) M 1964
One Round Rocket Launcher M 1964

Tanks ------------------------------ Weight class
If amphibious
Sighting year

Medium Tank M 1964
Light Amphibious Tank 1964

Armoured Personnel Carrier _________ If amphibious
If tracked or half-tracked
Sighting year

APCM1964
Amphibious Tracked APC M 1964

Assault guns (SU's) ----------------- Description
Caliber (without mm)
Sighting year

SU-100 M 1964

E-2
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NATION OF ORIGIN......:.
Type of equipment

Examples

Items in title

Soft skinned vehicles including wheeled If amphibious
ainphibians ----------------------- If tracked
Description
Type of drive (wheels)
Sighting year

Truck, 4x2, M 1964
Ainphibious Truck, 4x4, M 1965
Tracked Amphibian M 1964

Engineer equipment -------,----------- Description
Sighting year

Trencher M 19?4
Ponton M 1964
'

Radars ----------------------------- Description and type
Sighting year

Tactical Control SAM Radar M 1964
Surveillance Field Radar M 1964
Fire Control Antiaircraft Radar M 1964

Guided Inissile/free rocket ----------- Role
Sighting year

FROG 1964
SCUD1964
(also use STANAG 3236 when applicable)
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